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TEN	JUSTIFICATION	GAMES
❧
Imagine	you	have	an	odd	friend—call	him	Larry.	When	he's	with	you,	he
assesses	your	feeling-state	periodically	and	keeps	a	log.	He	also	notes,	in	the
log,	everything	he	does	with	you.	He	looks	for	correlations	between	positive
feelings	and	things	he	did	with	you.	See,	Larry	is	a	hedonic	utilitarian;	that	is,	he
believes	the	right	actions	are	those	which	make	people	happy.	Unlike	most
hedonic	utilitarians,	Larry	tries	to	live	directly	by	his	ethics.	His	way	of	being
helpful	is	to	take	exactly	those	actions	he	thinks	will	lead	to	positive	feelings	in
you,	based	on	the	log.	For	Larry,	to	believe	an	action	led	to	positive	feelings	is
to	believe	it	has	benefited	you.
Imagine,	furthermore,	that	a	journalist	is	around—verifying	and	investigating
Larry’s	log	and	his	claims.	She	asks	you	things	like	"on	this	day,	Larry	assessed
you	as	happy.	Were	you	really	happy?	Happier	than	the	day	before?".	So	there's
an	external	effort	to	verify	Larry’s	stories	about	helping	you,	using	the	same
terms	Larry	uses.	(Game	1.)
I	would	like	to	say	that	Larry	and	the	journalist	are	playing	a	justification	game.
This	game	they	are	playing	is	one	way	to	realize	an	ethics—in	this	case,	hedonic
utilitarianism.
I	want	to	highlight	two	aspects	of	this:	First,	Larry	and	the	journalist	use	a
certain	vocabulary	to	describe	you—in	this	case,	a	vocabulary	of	feeling	states.
Other	such	games	could	use	other	vocabularies:	they	could	describe	you	in	terms
of	your	preferences,	choices,	or	goals,	your	search	for	consistent	or	true	beliefs,
or	your	drives	for	status,	power,	or	social	acceptance.
Second,	Larry	and	the	journalist	use	certain	processes;	at	minimum,	these
include:	(1)	a	way	to	read	you	in	terms	of	their	vocabulary	(e.g.,	to	get
information	about	your	feelings,	goals,	or	preferences),	(2)	a	way	to	verify	that
related	events	happened	(e.g.,	that	feelings	were	positive,	that	goals	were
achieved,	that	preferences	were	satisfied),	and	(3)	a	way	to	turn	such	readings
and	events	into	justifications	or	claims	of	benefit	(e.g.,	that	feelings	were	more
positive	than	they	would	have	been	otherwise,	more	goals	were	achieved,
stronger	preferences	satisfied).	Additional	processes	may	also	be	necessary—for
instance,	because	people	don’t	have	their	feelings,	goals,	or	preferences	all
worked	out,	Larry	or	the	journalist	might	also	need	(4)	ways	to	clarify	or
elaborate	their	readings	on	demand	(such	as	requests	to	introspect	about	feelings,
elaborate	or	revise	goals,	reframe	preferences).
The	vocabulary	and	the	related	processes	together	make	a	justification	game.
Larry's	game	is,	of	course,	a	simplistic	way	to	play	hedonic	utilitarianism.	One
could	make	up	a	better	game	for	the	same	ethics.	But	a	game	must	be	chosen:	it
is	only	when	realized	as	a	justification	game	that	an	ethical	framework	can	guide
projects,	direct	choices,	or	support	claims	that	something	is	good	for	people.
Some	ethical	frameworks	might	be	impractical	as	games.1	Others	might	lead	to
error-prone	games:	reading	people	in	a	certain	way	can	be	systematically	off.
Verifying	events	in	a	certain	way	can	fail.	Worse,	some	games	might	give	Larry
room	to	fudge	the	stories:	He	might	be	able	to	claim	benefit	where	none	was
provided	(even	with	the	journalist	checking).
I	will	focus	here	on	ways	that	justification	games	can	be	error-prone,	or	can
allow	for	fudged	stories.	Here	are	four	ways	that	Larry’s	justification	game	can
cause	trouble.	Two	are	problems	of	autonomy,	and	two	are	problems	of	scope.
First,	note	that	Larry	might	try	to	make	you	happy	at	times	when	you	don’t
want	to	be	happy,	or	when	you	want	to	make	up	your	own	mind	whether	to
be	happy.	Feelings—and	the	recognitions	that	precede	them—are
something	we	seem	to	want	to	do	for	ourselves.	We	don’t	generally	want
other	people	to	work	directly	on	which	feelings	we	should	have,	so	Larry’s
game	is	intrusive	because	it	takes	your	feelings	as	his	goal.2
Second,	Larry	might	side	with	one	part	of	you,	against	another.	What	if
pizza	makes	you	happy	immediately,	and	writing	makes	you	happy	with
some	delay?	Should	Larry	order	you	a	pizza	or	lock	you	in	your	writing
closet?	Larry	doesn’t	know	if	you	prefer	to	live	for	the	moment	(with	pizza)
or	prefer	to	take	the	long	view	(and	write).	He	has	no	vocabulary	for	these
notions.	He	can	have	no	sense	of	what	you	want	on	balance.3	If	you	haven’t
yet	settled	the	matter	for	yourself,	then—whether	it’s	pizza	or	the	closet—it
buries	your	conflict	and	delays	its	resolution,	widening	your	inner	conflict.
In	these	cases,	Larry’s	game	is	divisive.
Now,	the	problems	of	scope.
First,	imagine	that	you	are	upset	with	Larry	because	he	doesn’t	want	to	tell
you	bad	news.	He	says	the	bad	news	you	want	to	hear	is	unlikely	to	lead	to
positive	feelings	overall.	You	might	admit	this	is	true,	but	want	him	to	level
with	you	anyways.	Feeling	good	doesn’t	cover	everything	important	to	you.
But	feeling	good	is	all	that	counts	in	Larry’s	vocabulary.	So,	Larry	can
duck	certain	responsibilities,	because	his	vocabulary	and	processes	don’t
register	the	relevant	harms.	Larry’s	game	inarticulate	about	his	effect	on
you.
Next,	imagine	that	you	tend	to	feel	better	on	Friday	afternoons,	but	that	this
has	nothing	to	do	with	what	Larry	does.	Larry	could	misread	this	pattern	as
supporting	various	interventions	in	your	life.	When	Larry	sells	you	a	fidget
spinner	on	a	random	weekday,	he	always	sees	a	spike	between	1	and	6	days
later.	There’s	a	similar	problem	if	your	moods	are	random—by	tuning	the
parameters	of	his	analysis	(such	as	the	assumed	delay	between	an	act	and
the	resulting	positive	feelings)	Larry	can	find	support	for	a	hypotheses.4
“False	positive	rates	increase	with	the	degree	of	analytical	flexibility”5.
Larry’s	game	is	prone	to	what	have	been	called	voodoo	correlations6	or
junk	science.	Larry’s	vocabulary	doesn’t	allow	him	to	collect	your	own
testimony	about	why	you	were	happy	at	any	particular	time.	This	means
Larry	can	entertain	almost	any	hypothesis	about	the	causes	of	your	feelings
—none	of	which	would	appear	in	your	own	self-understanding.	These
hypotheses	can	be	flexibly	matched	against	whatever	data	in	the	feeling-
state	log	supports	it.7	And	it	will	be	hard	for	you	or	the	journalist	to	argue
with	these	conclusions	using	only	the	vocabulary	of	feeling-states	and
interventions.	So,	Larry’s	game	allows	justifications	to	be	cooked	up.	This
particular	way	to	cook	up	justifications	I’ll	call	cherry-picked	correlations.
These	four	are	problems	even	if	Larry	means	well.	But	they	are	worse	if	he’s
hostile,	self-interested,	or	he	only	wants	to	seem	beneficial	and	pass	the
journalist’s	tests.	In	this	case,	Larry	can	be	cleverly	inarticulate	to	hide	what	he
takes	from	you.	He	can	cook	up	justifications	for	things	you	don’t	really	want.
He	can	be	strategically	divisive,	turning	you	against	the	part	of	yourself	which
doesn’t	serve	his	interest.	He	can	be	unaccountably	intrusive	whenever	it	suits
him	to	take	over	part	of	your	life.
To	use	the	lingo	of	computer	security,	I	will	call	such	problems	vulnerabilities	of
Larry’s	game,	and	that	they	show	how	Larry’s	game	can	be	exploited.	Games
which	aren’t	vulnerable	to	such,	I	will	call	robust.
Which	justification	games	are	robust?	What	kinds	of	thinking	(vocabularies)	and
communicating	(processes)	can	justify	projects	without	causing	these	problems?
I	believe	this	question	has	importance	for	political	theory,	for	ethics,	and	for
practical	life.	These	problems	with	justification	games	can	tell	us	a	lot	about
which	ethical	and	political	views	should	be	practiced.
In	particular,	I’ll	argue	that	thinking	in	terms	of	people’s	feelings,	drives,
preferences,	beliefs,	or	goals	isn’t	a	reliable	way	to	serve	them,	because	even
accurate	information	about	people’s	good	feelings,	expressed	drives,	satisfied
preferences,	improved	beliefs,	or	achieved	goals	can	be	used	against	them	while
appearing	to	have	benefited	them.	So	common	justifications	for	projects—like
giving	people	positive	feelings	or	making	their	goals	happen—can	be	rejected	on
this	basis.
I’ll	also	argue	for	a	certain	justification	game—one	I	believe	is	robust.	It	is
centered	around	people’s	values:	their	guiding	ideas	about	how	best	to	live,
approach	things,	relate	to	other	people,	and	the	like8.	I’ll	build	up	a	picture	of
what	this	means	practically:	of	how	we	can	think	and	communicate	this	way.
I	have	two	hopes	for	this	project.	First,	it	may	address	philosophical	questions
like	these:
What	inside	of	us	is	to	be	honored?
Where	is	the	source	of	dignity	and	meaning	in	our	lives?
What	does	it	really	mean	to	be	good	to	people?
What	does	it	mean	to	benefit	a	community,	or	to	harm	society?
What	makes	a	good	society?
These	questions	have	often	been	understood	abstractly,	but	they	could	be
reinterpreted	as	questions	about	enactable	types	of	thinking	and	practical
processes	of	investigation.	In	this	case,	they	are	helpfully	approached	in	terms	of
justification	games	and	how	they	go	wrong.
My	other	hope	is	that	a	theory	of	robust	justification	games	will	help	us	better
evaluate	the	claims	around	us.
Leaders	in	politics	or	policy	are	embedded	in	justification	games.	A	city	planner
must	justify	her	plans	and	interventions	as	benefiting	the	people	of	her	city.	So
must	a	politician	justify	projects	in	her	district.	NGOs	and	governmental	bodies
make	claims	that	they	provide	various	social	benefits	(e.g.,	that	they	strengthen
community	or	improve	lives),	or	that	they	reduce	social	harms(e.g.,	that	they
reduce	radicalization	or	polarization	or	bullying).	Similarly,	justification	games
are	involved	whenever	a	product	or	business	is	supposed	to	be	good	for	people,
humane,	user-centered,	or	human-centered,	to	help	people	thrive	or	to
experience	wellbeing.
Many	of	these	businesses,	organizations,	and	governments	are	using	exploitable
justification	games	to	make	these	claims.	Identifying	which	justification	games
are	robust	may	help	us	recognize	when	to	trust	claims	like	these,	and	when	not
to.	It	may	help	us	see	who	can	legitimately	serve	us.	Ultimately,	this	may	lead	to
better	politics	and	better	business.
Ten	Justification	Games
I	will	cover	these	justification	games.	Only	the	last	is	robust	to	the	vulnerabilities
named	above.
1.	 Positive	Feelings	(Larry’s	Game)
2.	 Goals	Reached
3.	 Preferences	Revealed
4.	 Advances	in	Wellbeing	or	Flourishing
5.	 Triumph	of	Our	Better	Selves	over	Our	Unreasoned	Selves
6.	 Triumph	of	Our	Better	Selves	over	Zero-Sum	Games
7.	 Advances	in	Knowledge
8.	 Living	by	Their	Values
9.	 Living	by	Their	Present	and	Future	Values
10.	 Living	On	Their	Own	Terms
Goals-Reached
Game	2.	Jeff,	a	billionaire,	runs	an	e-commerce	site.	He	also	sells	a	digital
assistant	technology.	Jeff	believes	he	helps	a	customer	when	that	customer’s
goals	are	accomplished	using	Jeff’s	tech	(and	when	there’s	evidence	that	it
would	have	been	harder	or	more	expensive	otherwise).	He	checks	with	the
customer	to	make	sure	he	got	their	goals	right,	and	to	clear	up	doubts	about
their	meaning,	he	encourages	them	to	describe	their	goal	vividly,	as	a	future
state	of	the	world.	Naturally,	he	tries	to	stay	focused	on	goals	his	tech	empire
can	help	with.
Jeff’s	game	fits	within	a	family	of	justification	games	where	benefit	means
getting	people	what	they	desire	or	prefer;	for	example,	by	achieving	their	goals
or	satisfying	their	preferences.	One	attractive	feature	of	this	family	of	games	is
the	degree	of	openness	it	leaves	for	different	people	to	desire	different	things—
its	impartiality.
This	family	can	be	broken	down	in	different	ways,	but	I	will	separate	out	the
justification	games	that	assume	desires	are	articulable	and	conscious	from	those
which	drop	this	assumption.	When	desires	are	considered	articulable,	the	games
can	include	processes	of	asking	about	desires	or	recognizing	them,	and	asking	if
they’ve	been	fulfilled.	In	such	case,	what’s	desired	is	often	called	a	goal	or
intent.	But,	when	are	people	thought	to	have	inarticulate	desires,	then	the	desires
must	be	detected	or	revealed	through	their	behavior	over	time.	What’s	desired
then	gets	called	a	taste,	a	like,	or	a	revealed	preference.
When	desires	are	articulable,	it	is	usually	also	imagined	that	they	are	relatable
(whereas	preferences	are	imagined	as	idiosyncratic),	temporary	(whereas
preferences	are	semi-permanent),	and	precise	(whereas	preferences	describe
more	general	patterns).
So,	Jeff’s	game	is	focused	on	articulable	desires—which	I	will	call	goals.	Here,
what’s	desired	is	often	understood	as	a	future	world-state,	or	a	set	of	such	states
where	certain	conditions	hold.	Certain	social	sciences	have	focused	on	reading
people	as	goal-havers,	including	rational	choice	theory,	decision	science,	and
operations	research.	The	processes	of	software	design	and	industrial	design	were
originally	built	on	these	readings—objects	(especially	computers)	have	a
function,	which	is	to	help	people	with	goals.9
Someone	who	uses	these	processes—and	understands	serving	people	s
addressing	their	articulable	desires—might	build	something	like	Google	search
or	an	email	tool.	If	the	product	helps	the	user	achieve	a	goal	(such	as
“responding	to	an	email”)	then	it	must	be	helping	the	user.
❧
Andy,	a	user	with	goals,	comes	to	Jeff’s	e-commerce	platform	and	buys	a	sketchy
health	product	like	weight	control	pills.	Andy’s	goals	include:	(1)	to	buy/have
these	particular	pills;	(2)	to	complete	the	purchase;	(3)	to	receive	the	pills
quickly;	(4)	to	lose	weight	more	generally	;	(5)	certain	even	higher	level	goals:
to	be	accepted,	to	feel	healthy,	to	be	more	attractive	to	others.	Andy	would	agree
he	had	all	of	these	goals	in	mind	at	different	times.
Belle	has	conflicting	goals:	she	wants	to	finishing	writing	her	book	chapter,	and
she	also	wants	to	stream	great	original	films	at	a	low	price.
❧
With	Andy,	we	see	an	immediate	problem	with	game	2:	Jeff	can	cherry	pick	a
goal	which	fits	his	purposes.	When	asked	by	the	journalist,	Andy	has	to	admit
that	he	really	had	such	a	goal,	and	that	what	was	delivered	matched	it.
This	another	way	to	cook	up	justifications,	but	it’s	a	little	different	than	what	we
saw	with	Larry’s	game.	Here,	what’s	being	cherry-picked	is	a	certain	reading	of
Andy.	When	there	are	many	ways	of	interpreting	people,	a	justifier	who	wants	to
seem	like	he’s	helping	can	choose	the	interpretation	that	makes	him	sound	the
most	beneficial.	In	this	case,	there's	a	choice	of	goals.	I’ll	call	this	method	of
cooking	up	justification	cherry-picked	interpretations	of	people.
It	might	seem	that	there	are	ways	to	solve	this	problem—perhaps	Jeff	should
only	count	himself	as	beneficial	if	he	helps	Andy	with	a	fully-informed	goal,	or
an	ultimate	goal.	Or	perhaps	only	goals	that	are	both	fully-informed	and	ultimate
should	count.	On	this	view,	the	goal	about	buying	pills	should	be	thrown	out	as
misinformed,	while	the	one	about	completing	the	transaction	quickly	should	be
thrown	out	because	it’s	just	a	step	in	a	larger	goal.
But	it	is	hard	to	say	which	of	our	goals	count	as	fully-informed,	and	even	harder
to	say	which	are	ultimate.	Many	of	our	largest	and	most	weighty	choices	in	life
—to	marry	a	certain	spouse,	or	to	attend	a	certain	university—seem	neither
fully-informed	nor	ultimate,	so	why	should	we	expect	our	interactions	with	an
online	platform	to	be	so?
One	could	go	even	further	in	this	direction	and	claim	that	everyone	has	the	same
ultimate	goal	or	goals,	including	perhaps	some	of	Andy’s:	to	be	accepted,	to	feel
healthy,	to	be	more	attractive	to	others.	There	are	many	problems	with	such	an
approach,	which	I’ll	get	to	in	games	4	and	5.	For	now,	it’s	enough	to	note	we
lose	much	of	the	appeal	of	Jeff’s	game	in	taking	this	approach.	Jeff	helps	people
with	whatever	they	come	for,	without	making	assumptions	about	what	their
goals	should	be.	By	falling	back	to	Jeff’s	concept	of	universal	human	goals,	this
advantage	is	lost.
Yet	so	long	as	Jeff	stays	open	to	the	entire	tree	of	goals	that	a	person	has,	there	is
the	problem	of	what,	in	the	introduction,	I	called	cooked	up	justifications—Jeff
can	pick	the	stories	of	benefit	that	suit	his	own	aims.
And	as	the	interaction	with	Belle	shows,	his	game	also	divisive.
Let’s	say	Jeff’s	platform	helps	Belle	with	her	goal	about	streaming,	rather	than
her	goal	about	finishing	her	chapter.	Jeff	has	no	way	to	discover	which	of	these
goals	is	in	Belle’s	truest	interest.	Both	goals	could	be	real	and	of	equal	weight.
Both	could	even	be	ultimate	goals	of	Belle’s.	And	Belle	may	not	have
formulated	any	goal	about	which	to	do	first.	Yet	it	could	still	matter	to	Belle
which	goal	she	is	helped	with.
How	could	this	be?
Belle	could	have	ideas	about	how	she	wants	to	live	that	aren’t	about	reaching
one	goal-state	or	another,	but	are	about	how	she	lives	along	the	way.	She	might
want	to	be	dutiful,	and	put	work	first,	or	to	be	free	with	herself	and	watch	a	film
when	she	feels	like	it.
It	could	be	that	Jeff	needs	information	like	this	to	decide	whether	he’s	helped
Belle,	but	he	has	committed	to	describing	her	in	terms	of	her	goals.	Neither
being	dutiful	nor	free	with	herself	is	specified	as	a	goal	state.
One	way	that	Jeff	might	repair	his	game	is	to	broaden	his	reading	of	people	to
include	information	beyond	goals,	and	I	will	look	at	this	possibility	in	games	8,	9
and	10.	But	if	Jeff’s	claims	are	built	only	from	her	goals,	when	he	is	claiming	to
help	Belle,	he	is	actually	helping	one	part	of	her	against	another	part.
So	long	as	Jeff	stays	limited	to	goals,	but	open	to	the	entire	tree	of	goals	a	person
has,	his	justification	game	is	divisive	and	it	overstates	benefit.
❧
But	Jeff	is	an	inventive	fellow.	Imagine	he	invents	a	method	of	determining
which	goals	both	(a)	really	matter	to	a	person	and	(b)	address	the	whole	of	their
being	(rather	than	one	part	against	another).	Jeff	will—from	now	on—only
consider	himself	to	benefiting	people	if	he	delivers	on	these	special	goals.
Game	2	still	has	problems.
Carmen	uses	Jeff’s	digital	assistant	technology.	It	reads	her	mind.	Things
appear	on	it’s	to-do	list	as	soon	as	she	desires	them,	if	they	are	possible	at	all.
And	as	soon	as	they	appear,	BAM!	The	digital	assistant	rearranges	the	world
into	the	goal	state.	So,	as	soon	as	she	desires	to	write	a	book,	BAM!	It	was
written.	As	soon	as	she	desires	to	spend	a	day	relaxing	with	someone,	BAM!
That	day	just	happened.	She	has	the	memories	implanted	in	her,	but	the	day	is
over.
Dante	also	uses	Jeff’s	digital	assistant	technology.	He	uses	it	to	set	up	all	of	his
relationships	and	collaborations.	It	solves	—	forever	—	the	problem	of
determining	which	trades	and	contractual	arrangements	will	work	in	his
personal	and	work	life.	Dante	immediately	knows	who	could	hire	him,	how
much	they	would	pay,	and	what’s	expected.	Same	with	his	personal	life:	he
immediately	knows	where	there’s	mutual	desire	—	for	kissing,	for	sleeping
together,	for	going	out	to	dinner,	or	for	conversing	about	literature.	The	digital
assistant	removes	all	the	pain	and	confusion	of	negotiating,	of	searching,	of
flirting,	etc.	The	assistant	also	ensures	that	Dante’s	relationships	are	limited	to
the	contract	as	specified,	incurring	no	unforeseen	costs.
Tasks	and	trades	are	about	getting	to	desired	states.	These	stories	suggest	that
goal-states	don’t	cover	everything	we	want	out	of	life.10	Or,	in	the	terminology	I
used	earlier,	goal-related	justification	games	are	inarticulate	about	some	harms
—because	harms	in	non-goal-related	areas	go	uncounted,	and	thus	net-harms	can
be	cast	as	benefits.
What	exactly	remains	uncounted,	here?
A	list	has	been	made	of	what	Carmen	wants	to	happen:
write	a	book
day	with	lover
But	a	second	list	has	been	omitted,	a	list	of	how	she	wants	these	things	to
happen:
write	a	book—thoughtfully,	cleverly,	with	an	eye	towards	impacting	the
world	of	ideas,	and	with	great	personal	focus
day	with	lover—cultivating	intimacy	by	balancing	patience	and
impulsiveness,	empathy	and	charm
It	seems	clear	that	if	the	book-writing	or	day-spending	has	been	automated,	there
is	no	way	for	Carmen	to	live	according	to	the	second	list.	And	it	might	be	that
her	ambition	is	not	just	to	get	something	done,	but	to	do	it	herself,	and	to	do	it	in
a	certain	way.
This	brings	us	back	to	something	mentioned	earlier:	Carmen	has	ideas	about
how	she	wants	to	live—ideas	that	aren’t	about	reaching	one	goal-state	or
another,	but	about	how	she	lives	along	the	way.	The	vocabulary	of	Jeff’s	game
can’t	express11	those	ideas	or	check	if	they	worked	out,	and	that’s	where	the
blind	spots	are.	Rather	than	getting	these	things	done	in	the	way	she	likes	to,	the
focus	on	goal-states	will	lead	to	patterns	of	action	that	are	goal-focused:	patterns
like	productivity	and	efficiency	will	supplant	the	patterns	Carmen	would	have
specified—like	cultivating	intimacy	and	thoughtfulness.12
And	sometimes	this	is	more	than	just	ducking	responsibility—to	the	degree	that
Carmen’s	goals	are	venues	for	her	to	go	through	a	particular	process	or	to	face	a
particular	challenge,	when	the	digital	assistant	auto-accomplishes	a	goal,	it’s	not
just	leaving	something	out.	It’s	also	taking	away	her	venue	for	that	challenge	or
process.	This	is	what,	in	the	intro,	I	called	intrusiveness.
We	should	be	sure	that—whatever	we	do	to	help	people—we	aren’t	taking	away
something	they'd	really	like	to	do	themselves.	We	don't	want	to	automate	away
the	important	part	of	their	life.	Getting	the	relevant	information	from	them	and
acting	on	it	should	leave	the	important	part	up	to	them,	retaining	their	sense	of
self	and	purpose.
Preferences-Revealed
Let’s	turn	to	inarticulable	desires—which	I	will	call	preferences.
What	are	preferences?	Unlike	goals,	these	are	often	understood	as
idiosyncratic13	and	permanent.	Social	sciences	with	this	reading	of	people
include	microeconomics,	welfare	economics	(especially	in	notions	like	Pareto
optimality)	and	certain	fields	in	computer	science—notably	recommender
systems	and	collaborative	filtering.	A	person	is	said	to	have	a	preference	profile
(also	sometimes	called	a	utility	function14)	and	while	this	may	differ	from	person
to	person15,	it	stays	similar	for	one	person	over	time.	Indeed,	recommender
services	like	Facebook’s	News	Feed,	YouTube,	and	Netflix	build	such	a	reading
of	a	person,	based	on	patterns	in	consumption	choices,	and	this	is	used	in	stories
of	benefit.	If	their	product	gives	the	user	something	they	have	a	taste	for	(such	as
“seeing	photos	of	my	friends”)	then	the	product	must	be	helping	the	user.
The	idea	of	serving	diverse	preferences	might	be	appealing—this	seems	even
more	impartial	than	serving	diverse	goals:	people	are	subject	to	social	pressure
with	regard	to	what	they	say	is	a	goal.	People	claim	goals	which,	when	it	comes
down	to	it,	they	wouldn’t	actually	want	to	pursue.	There	are	false	goals	due	to
wishful	thinking,	or	the	desire	to	fit	in.	But	choices	speak	louder	than	words.	If
stated	goals	aren’t	to	be	trusted,	we	can	look	to	revealed	preferences.
Game	3.	Moses	is	a	city	planner,	and	Mark	runs	a	social	network.	Both	play	a
justification	game	around	revealed	preferences.	If	citizens	or	users	are	doing
one	thing	rather	than	another	when	they	seem	to	have	both	options—for
instance,	if	they	are	driving	cars	instead	of	taking	public	transit—then	it	is
considered	beneficial	to	provide	more	of	what	they	are	choosing.	Moses	says
“people	prefer	driving”	in	his	city	and	Mark	says	“people	love	to	scroll”	on	his
app.16
There	is	a	great	advantage	in	this	game:	it	is	data-driven,	dispensing	with	the
nonsense	of	people’s	reported	or	verified	goals.	It	soars	above	the	crowd,
viewing	emergent	behavior	with	a	detached	and	objective	eye.
But,	do	people	really	love	to	scroll?	Are	there	people	who	wake	up	every
morning	and	consider	driving	or	taking	public	transit,	all	else	equal,	and	choose
driving	(perhaps	for	the	quiet,	isolated	experience)?	Or	is	it	rather	that	they
prefer	a	job	at	one	place	(accessible	only	by	roads)	to	another	(accessible	by
transit)?	If	the	latter,	their	choice	doesn’t	count	as	a	vote	in	favor	of	the	transit
planning,	but	rather	in	favor	of	certain	jobs.	The	driving	could	even	be	a
drawback	of	these	better	jobs.
To	settle	this	matter,	we	should	like	to	ask	these	people	why	they	are	scrolling,
and	why	they	took	the	car	and	not	the	train.	But,	in	our	move	towards	greater
objectivity	and	hard	data,	we	seem	to	have	cut	off	exactly	this	option.	We	have
decided	not	to	trust	what	people	say,	and	this	leaves	us	clueless	about	what
preference	is	actually	being	expressed	in	their	choice,	and	thus	about	who	should
get	credit	for	benefitting	them.
Without	being	able	to	ask	why,	any	particular	choice	can	be	read	as	expressing
myriad	preferences.	Mark	and	Moses	can	cherry-pick	the	preferences	that	make
them	seem	beneficial.	By	setting	the	same	choices	in	different	contexts—
imagining	their	users	or	citizens	as	choosing	between	different	hypothetical
menus—they	can	make	up	“revealed	preferences”	that	fit	their	need	for
justification.	This	is	similar	to	what	we	saw	with	goals:	they	are	cooking	up
justifications	by	cherry-picking	interpretations	of	people.
But	there's	also	a	second	way	that	a	justification	based	on	preference	can	be
cooked	up:	by	altering	the	landscape	to	structure	people's	choices	so	it	looks	like
they're	choosing	what	you	provide.	In	this	case,	a	highway	builder	could	make
behind-the-scenes	deals	to	ensuring	the	jobs	are	in	places	inaccessible	to	transit.
Emily,	a	user	with	preferences,	uses	Mark’s	app	in	a	way	that	might	reveal	a
preference	for	procrastination	and	social	isolation.	She	also	seems	to	prefer
scrolling	to	commenting	within	the	app.	The	app	gives	her	choices	between
scrolling	and	commenting,	and	she	takes	scrolling.
Does	Emily	prefer	scrolling	in	general?	Is	she	more	fulfilled,	now	that	she	has
the	app	and	can	scroll	in	it?	Or	is	scrolling	perhaps	a	cost	she	is	willing	to	pay
for—let’s	say—the	faint	possibility	she	will	find	a	human	connection	on	the	app.
If	the	latter,	it	would	be	fairer	to	say	that	Emily	prefers	even	low-probability
human	connection	to	commenting	on	random	posts.	But	game	3	will	not	reveal
this	preference,	instead,	it	provides	spurious	support	for	the	false	idea	that	she
prefers	scrolling—and	thus	that	increases	in	scrolling	might	benefit	her.	A
problem	of	cooked	up	justifications,	via	both	a	cherry-picked	interpretation	of
Emily,	and	via	a	broader	manipulation	of	her	environment.
Advances	in	Wellbeing	or	Flourishing
Larry’s	game,	in	the	introduction,	was	just	one	example	of	a	family	of
justification	games	which	imagine	that	there	are	good	and	bad	physical	states	of
a	person.	In	the	simplest	versions,	pleasure	is	considered	better	than	suffering;
the	more	complex	ones	aim	at	higher	pleasures,	or	happiness,	or	wellbeing,
eudaemonia,	or	flourishing.
It	seems	to	me	that—even	on	the	most	charitable	reading—one	can’t	turn	these
into	robust	justification	games.	And	that	this	is	true	whether	you	imagine	that
people	can	self-report	their	wellbeing/eudaemonia	level,	or	whether,
alternatively,	you	try	to	calculate	a	wellbeing/eudaemonia	level	for	everyone
according	to	some	universal	recipe.
To	be	charitable,	let	us	begin	by	dispensing	with	the	analytical	limits	of	Larry’s
game.
Game	4.	Sergei	is	not	limited	to	recording	your	emotion/wellbeing/eudaemonia
state	and	inferring	what	to	do	from	it;	rather,	he	can	ask	any	questions	he	likes,
gather	any	other	data,	and	build	sophisticated	models	of	your	interests,	dreams,
and	desires.	He	even	has	a	magically	accurate	way	to	predict	which
interventions	will	result	in	greater	lifetime	levels	of	wellbeing/eudaemonia.
These	are	the	interventions	he	counts	as	beneficial.
If	these	levels	of	wellbeing/eudaemonia	are	self-reported,	one	problem	Sergei
faces	is	that	many	people	don’t	seem	to	be	going	for	wellbeing,	as	they
themselves	would	define	it.
Francesca	doesn’t	seem	to	be	going	for	wellbeing.	She	was	born	with	family
money	but	put	herself	through	a	grueling	grad	school	regimen	and	the	stress	of	a
PhD	thesis.	She	gave	birth	to	two	children	and	cared	for	them,	forgoing	sleep,
sex,	and	many	other	pleasures	in	their	early	years.	After	this	she	wrote	book
after	book,	and	took	in	her	ailing	father	to	care	for	at	home,	refusing	to	hire	a
nurse	or	to	send	him	away	to	a	home.	Francesca	says	that	there’s	more	to	life
than	her	own	wellbeing.	She	believes	she,	personally,	could	have	been	happier
without	the	PhD,	the	second	child,	the	books,	or	the	ailing	father,	but	that	her
life	would	be	less	meaningful	or	would	involve	less	of	what	mattered	to	her	to
do.
Francesca	wouldn’t	choose—for	herself—to	maximize	her	lifetime	(or
momentary)17	wellbeing.	She	is	pursuing	things	that	mean	more	to	her	than
wellbeing.	Many	would	agree	with	Francesca:	people	like	Rosa	Parks,	Malcolm
X,	Nikola	Tesla,	and	Mother	Teresa	seem	to	have	chosen	something	besides
their	own	wellbeing	or	eudaemonia.	One	can	imagine	Sergei	intervening	with
Rosa	Parks:	“Rosa,	instead	of	making	all	this	fuss,	why	not	enroll	in	a	relaxing
yoga	class	and	take	a	bath?”.	Sergei	could	support	this	with	a	variety	of
neuroimaging	and	survey-based	wellbeing	studies,	showing	that	baths	are	better
for	wellbeing	than	civil	rights	activism.	Rosa	might	agree	with	Sergei’s	data	but
still	choose	activism	over	the	bathtub.
Once	again	we	return	to	a	theme:	Rosa	has	ideas	about	how	she	wants	to	live
that	aren’t	about	wellbeing,	eudaemonia,	or	happiness.	So	long	as	these	are
ignored,	the	game	is	insensitive	to	harms.	Only	a	justification	game	which
supports	those	ideas	could	avoid	harming	Rosa	or	Francesca.
But	what	if	we	don’t	accept	Rosa’s	or	Francesca’s	subjective	notion	of	wellbeing
or	eudaemonia,	and	instead	insist	on	a	definition	which	includes	their	activities
in	some	universal	recipe	of	wellbeing.	Within	this	universal	recipe,	civil	rights
activism	and	stressful	PhD	writing	are	part	of	a	life	of	wellbeing.	They	enhance
it.	Perhaps	we	could	even	build	such	a	universal	recipe	using	results	from
positive	or	emotional	psychology,	wellbeing	studies,	a	theory	of	universal
human	values18,	or	neuroimaging.
Even	if	we	grant	the	scientific	plausibility	of	such	a	thing	(which	I	don’t),	there
are	three	issues	which	might	lead	us	to	doubt	whether	it	can	be	worked	into	a
justification	game.
First,	note	is	that	this	universal	recipe	would	be	of	immense	political	and
economic	import.	Certain	parties	would	be	very	interesting	in	whether	it	can	be
nudged	towards	more/less	political	activism,	more/less	material	consumption,
and	so	on.
Second,	this	recipe	as	understood	would	be	making	strong	statements	about
Francesca	which	she	must	take	on	faith	and	which	don’t	match	her	own	sense	of
things:	in	particular,	it	tells	her	she’s	a	person	who	can	only	reach	wellbeing	by
going	to	grad	school,	having	children,	and	so	on.	If	today	it	tells	her	that	the
grueling	part	of	grad	school	was	the	best	wellbeing	can	get	for	her,	tomorrow
maybe	it’ll	say	her	best	life	involves	drug-addiction,	torture,	and	a	pet	rabbit.	We
have	already	declared	that	Francesca	doesn’t	get	to	decide	what	wellbeing
means.	So	who	is	qualified	to	check	the	recipe?	Unless	it	is	God-given,	this
game	allows	for	cooked	up	justfications	via	its	unspecified	implementation
details.
Finally,	it	would	be	reasonable	to	think	that	this	recipe,	so	as	to	understand	what
would	bring	a	person	wellbeing,	might	need	information	about	their	goals,	their
preferences,	their	feelings,	their	social	acceptance,	their	values,	and	so	on.	If	this
is	the	case,	wellbeing	amounts	choosing	“all	of	the	above”	regarding	what
vocabulary	and	processes	to	use	in	reading	people.	This	means	that	a
justification	game	about	universal-recipe	wellbeing	would	inherit	many
problems	from	the	other	games.
Games	8	and	9	will	show	a	different	way	of	getting	at	the	same	idea	of
comprehensive	view,	without	relying	on	a	universal	recipe	and	without
demanding	that	everyone	value	their	own	wellbeing	above	all.
Triumph	over	Our	Unreasoned	Selves
I	now	turn	to	another	family	of	justification	games:	those	which	attempt	to	lay
out	what	is	justified	and	beneficial	by	contrast	with	what	is	not.	In	some	cases,
this	contrast	is	black	and	white:	one	part	of	human	life	is	read	as	a	vast	and
meaningless	noise,	a	futile	struggle,	or	an	empty	performance.	To	benefit	people
is	to	help	them	rise	above	this.	In	other	cases,	there	are	held	to	be	various	levels
or	developmental	stages,	and	benefit	means	advancing	along	these	stages.
In	service	of	these	views,	the	mind	may	be	read	as	having	a	“lower	layer”	that	is
animalistic	or	socially	performative,	plus	an	“upper	layer”	that	is	rational	or	that,
at	least,	can	be	engaged	in	a	noble	endeavor.	Understandings	of	this	“lower
layer”	vary:	is	it	driven	by	evolutionary	incentives	towards	status-seeking	or
tribalism?	By	power	or	dominance	games?	By	social	performances	more
generally?	Is	it	composed	of	mysterious	psychological	forces—like	the	id,	the
ego?	Are	we	addicted	to	our	own	brain	chemicals	(e.g.,	“dopamine	hits”)?	Are
we	just	“following	incentives”?
By	painting	some	background	like	this,	the	justification	games	in	this	category
get	built	around	the	triumph	of	some	“upper	layer”19	over	these	distractions,
addictions,	irrational	acts,	or	empty	performances.	Support	for	reading	people	in
these	terms	is	drawn	from	game	theory,	evolutionary	psychology20,	ethology,
behavioral21	and	hidden-motives	economics22	or	the	sociology	of	social
performances,	roles,	and	power	games23.	One	appeal	of	these	views	is	that	they
make	sense	—	better	than	some	of	the	previous	views	—	of	our	inner	conflicts,
or	why	we	sometimes	chose	things	we	regret.24
If	such	games	are	to	be	made	robust,	two	things	must	be	possible:	First,	there
must	be	a	procedure	for	helping	someone	advance	or	to	grow	on	their	own
terms,	without	violating	their	autonomy	or	abetting	inner	conflict.	Second,	it
must	be	established	that	the	supposed	division	between	upper	and	lower	levels	or
stages	really	does	separate	what’s	meaningful	and	of	benefit	from	what’s	not,
and	that	growth	along	these	axes	(or	triumph	of	our	better	selves)	encompasses
everything	that’s	important	to	people.	Otherwise,	the	game	will	either	be	under-
or	over-scoped.
Game	5.	Eliezer	tries	to	recognize	when	people	are	being	rational	and	when
they	aren’t,	with	the	hope	he	can	make	people	less	manipulable	through	their
irrational	behavior—including	their	addictions,	instincts	which	are	no	longer
adaptive,	and	so	on.	In	some	cases	he	will	ask	people	to	reevaluate	their
irrational	behavior;	in	others,	he’ll	just	make	it	count	less—reducing	its	role	in
the	economy,	in	which	media	goes	viral,	etc.	In	his	terms,	he’ll	dampen	the	part
of	the	economy	which	“responds	to	people's	brainstem”	rather	than	to	their
contemplative	sense	of	what's	best	for	them.	Success	in	this,	he	considers	benefit.
Is	Eliezer’s	game—which	holds	the	contemplative	or	rational	above	the
instinctual—really	in	the	right	about	what	is	meaningful?	Or	about	what	is	a
valuable	way	to	live?
Giorgio	has	two	selves,	one	self	believes	in	extensive	calculation,	and	he	uses	a
variety	of	spreadsheets	to	plan	his	dates,	vacations,	meals,	charitable	donations,
and	career	path.	But	his	other	self	believes	in	instinctual	living	and	occasionally
he	forgets	about	what	he	planned	in	the	spreadsheet	and	just	makes	an	offhand
joke	at	a	date,	reveals	something	personal	on	a	whim,	or	flies	to	Mallorca	last
minute	because	he	is	swept	over	by	a	desire	to	go	dancing	on	the	beach.
Now,	if	you	believe	that	my	description	of	Giorgio’s	“selves”25	is	relevant	to
Eliezer’s	game,	which	self	do	you	think	Eliezer	should	help?	The	answer	may
depend	on	whether	you	think	extensive	calculation	or	instinctual	living	is	better.
If	so,	this	is	a	pretty	big	value	judgement	to	make.
But	perhaps	the	example	of	Giorgio	seems	uncharitable.	When	Giorgio	flies	to
Mallorca,	swept	by	a	desire	to	go	dancing	on	the	beach	—	doesn’t	this	count	as	a
perfectly	good	reason?	Isn’t	this	perfectly	rational?	And	if	so,	what	separates	this
from	so-called	“irrational	behavior”?
Now,	you	might	respond	in	two	ways:	you	might	say	that	irrational	behavior	is
done	without	reasons—because	of	an	instinct	or	drive	or	a	raw	desire.	Or	you
might	say	that	irrational	behavior	is	done	because	of	bad	reasons.
Recent	work	in	the	philosophy	of	action26	doesn’t	leave	much	room	for	the	first
idea—that	we	act	without	reason.	It	seems	we	aren’t	comfortable	acting	when
we	don’t	know	our	reasons.	Even	if	we	imagine	we	are	probably	in	the	right—
we	stop	and	try	to	figure	out	what	we	are	up	to.	Here’s	David	Velleman:
Or,	as	Daniel	Hausman	put	it:
You	are	walking	up	Fifth	Avenue.	All	of	a	sudden	you	realize
that	you	don't	know	what	you're	doing.	You	can	see	that
you're	walking	up	Fifth	Avenue,	of	course:	the	surroundings
are	quite	familiar.	But	the	reason	why	you’re	walking	up
Fifth	Avenue	escapes	you,	and	so	you	still	don't	know	what
you're	doing.	Are	you	walking	home	from	work?	Trying	to
catch	a	downtown	bus?	Just	taking	a	stroll?	You	stop	to
think.27
My	awareness	of	a	desire	to	do	X	does	not	automatically
incline	me	to	do	X	intentionally,	unless	I	can	see	some
reason	to	do	X.	If	I	see	no	reason	to	do	X,	I	will	try	to
suppress	my	desire	to	do	it.	A	fervent	desire	to	eat	mouse
droppings	sends	people	to	a	therapist	rather	than	to	their
mouse-infested	basement	cupboards.28
We	are	quite	alarmed	when	something	doesn’t	have	the	blessing	of	our
rationality.	Here’s	another	example	from	Velleman:
Overall,	it	seems	we	are	hesitant	to	act	without	reason.30
Let’s	turn,	then,	to	the	other	possibility—that	irrational	acts	are	those	done	for
bad	reasons.	We	might	take	take	a	few	paradigmatic	examples:	the	act	of
checking	Facebook	when	you	should	be	working,	or	of	eating	a	piece	of
chocolate	cake	that	breaks	our	diet,	or	even	the	act	of	returning	to	a	drug
Imagine	that	your	arm	becomes	temporarily	paralyzed.
When	you	wake	up	each	morning,	the	first	thing	you	do	is	to
check	whether	you	have	regained	control	of	your	arm.	What
exactly	are	you	hoping	to	find?
Part	of	what	you’re	hoping	to	find,	no	doubt,	is	that	your
arm	moves.	But	movement	by	itself	wouldn’t	be	enough.
Waking	up	to	find	your	arm	flapping	around	aimlessly
wouldn’t	lead	you	to	think	that	your	control	over	it	had	been
restored.	You’d	have	to	conclude	instead	that	paralysis	had
given	way	to	a	spasm.
What	you’re	hoping	to	find,	then,	is	that	your	arm	not	only
moves	but	moves	when	and	where	you	want	it	to.	But	would
movement	in	response	to	your	desires	be	enough?	You	might
of	course	be	encouraged	if	you	found	your	hand	scratching
an	itch	behind	your	ear;	but	if	you	subsequently	found	it
grabbing	food	off	someone	else’s	plate,	you	wouldn’t
necessarily	be	re-assured	by	the	reflection	that	you	had
indeed	wanted	what	he	was	eating.29
addiction.
If	we	admit	that	there	are	reasons	behind	these	acts,	what	could	they	be?	Perhaps
we	check	facebook	because	we	hope	that	a	break	before	work	will	recharge	us,
or	help	us	feel	less	lonely	as	we	proceed	to	work.	Perhaps	the	cake	feels	like	a
way	to	enjoy	life	or	to	have	a	brief	sensory	delight	amidst	a	day	or	drudgery	and
disconnection.	Perhaps	returning	to	the	drug	is	the	only	way	we	see	how	to	make
a	tolerable	day	of	it.
While	these	may	be	bad	choices,	or	conflicted	ones,	it	is	hard	to	say	they	are
made	for	bad	reasons.	It	might	be	more	correct	to	say	they	were	made	for	short-
sighted	reasons,	or	for	reasons	that	take	into	account	some	factors	but	not	other
factors.	Yet	isn’t	this	the	case	with	all	of	our	choices?
On	balance,	it	seems	like	this	rational	/	irrational	line	is	a	hard	one	for	Eliezer’s
game	to	draw.	I	believe	this	is	good	news:	psychological	theories	that	paint
people	as	irrational	tend	to	imply	there’s	nothing	noble	that	they	hope	for,
nothing	their	actions	are	about.	When	people	aren’t	thought	to	have	reasons	or
values	of	their	own,	there’s	nothing	honorable	in	them	to	listen	to.	This	makes	it
hard	to	build	a	robust	process	or	vocabulary	so	as	to	know	when	you	are	serving
them.
A	robust	justification	game	may	have	to	look	into	the	details	of	people’s	reasons,
rather	than	draw	a	contrast	between	rational	and	irrational	choices,	or	between
good	and	bad	reasons.	Games	8	and	9	are	like	this.
Triumph	over	Zero-Sum	Games
Another	member	of	this	contrastive	family	avoids	speculating	about	human
psychology.	It	doesn’t	connect	blame	individual	irrationality	for	the	“lower
level”—the	vast	and	meaningless	noise,	the	futile	struggle,	or	the	empty
performance.	Instead,	it	places	blame	on	group	processes,	status-strivings	and
signaling,	or	social	performance—each	of	which	may	be	individually-rational,
but	which	are	held	to	be	meaningless	on-balance.
Game	6.	Scott	admires	Eliezer,	but	has	a	different	theory.	Scott	presumes	that
people	do	in	fact	have	good	reasons	for	even	ultimately	meaningless	acts.	The
problem	is	that	the	game	theory	of	social	performance	leads	to	zero-sum	status
and	tribal	games,	which	crowd	out	the	important	work	of	society.	By	damping
down	on	these	zero-sum	games,	Scott	believes	he	can	benefit	everyone	in	getting
back	to	the	meat	and	meaning	of	life.
Unfortunately	for	Scott,	drawing	lines	around	zero-sum	games	seems	no	easier
than	around	irrational	behavior.	I	will	start	with	the	easier	case:	games	of	status
and	signaling,	and	then	see	if	I	can	extend	it	to	games	of	power.
Hector	has	evolved	to	play	status	games.	These	feel	meaningful	to	him,	but	are
actually	meaningless.	At	work	he	is	a	chef	in	a	traditional	French	kitchen,	where
he	is	currently	the	sauté	chef	and	must	obey	the	sous-chef	(whom	he	hopes
someday	to	replace).	In	the	evening	he	is	a	tango	dancer,	acutely	aware	of	the
better	dancers	and	the	male-female	dynamics	wherein	the	best	or	most	attractive
dancers	manage	the	room.	Even	his	solitary	hobbies—arranging	flowers	in	his
study,	writing	in	his	journal,	and	so	on—are	calculated	to	win	an	eternal
struggle	to	rise	in	the	ranks.
Isaac	has	evolved	to	play	social	games	more	generally,	which	feel	meaningful	to
him	but	are	meaningless	on-balance.	He	is	trying	to	fit	in	and	to	enact	correctly
various	social	performances.	He	has	learned	how	to	be	a	good	man,	a	good
employee,	and	a	good	community	member—how	to	play	certain	roles	in	certain
scenes.	The	ideas	which	guide	him—ideas	like	productivity,	creativity,	success,
social	justice,	responsibility,	empathy,	or	ending	oppression—are	performative.
He	acts	in	certain	ways	to	seem	productive,	or	to	push	others	towards
productivity.	He	acts	in	certain	ways	to	seem	masculine,	and	so	on.	When	he	is
being	courageous,	it	is	a	performance	so	he	can	fit	into	a	particular	crowd
which	demands	courage,	etc.
Are	status-driven	environments—like	Hector’s	traditional	french	kitchen	or
tango	milonga—only	venues	for	status-games?	It	seems	not—people	are	also
there	to	dance	and	to	make	great	food.	The	interpretation	of	Hector	as	status-
driven	seems	to	be	a	bit	wonky.	It	seems	more	likely	that	he	loves	to	dance,
loves	to	cook,	and	that	his	hobby	of	arranging	flowers	is	not	an	elaborate	status
game—in	short,	that	Hector	is	a	creative	guy—with	values	like	self-expression,
living	an	embodied	life,	and	celebration.
Furthermore,	it	appears	certain	considerations	inform	what	it	is	to	have	status	in
different	places.	There	are	different	kinds	of	strengths	of	character	which	are
held	as	important—say	in	a	good	husband,	father,	or	wife—in	different
environments:	In	Moscow,	perhaps	a	good	husband	needs	to	be	ruthless.
Whereas	in	Berlin,	in	the	same	period,	a	good	husband	might	be	artsy	and	kind.
These	attributes	are	not	entirely	matters	of	performance.	They're	also	about
personal	values—the	ways	of	living	that	people	have	worked	out	for	themselves,
and	which	they	believe	in	on	their	own	terms.
We	can	see	this	by	noticing	the	difference	between	what	it	is	to	seem	ruthless	to
others,	and	what	it	would	be	to	be	ruthless	on	your	own	terms,	without	regard	to
how	you	come	off.
When	we	focus	on	social	performance	or	status	games,	we	focus	on	scenes:	on
royal	courts,	on	teen	subcultures,	etc.	But	scenes—even	these	scenes—are	also
venues	for	collecting	around,	sharing,	and	exploring	values.
This	explains	why—for	most	people—pure	social	performance	(doing	things
“just	for	show”)	is	somewhat	uncomfortable.	Sure,	it’s	quite	a	job	to	fit	in	and	to
play	social	games.	In	order	to	be	things	like	a	good	employee	or	a	good	man,	it’s
often	considered	that	you	need	a	job,	a	spouse,	a	means	of	transport,	certain
outfits,	and	so	on.	You	must	learn	a	huge	number	of	unwritten	social	rules	and	to
comply	with	them	improvisationally.	But	when	we	imagine	a	person	for	whom
social	performance	(such	as	acting	polite,	responding	promptly,	acting	cool)	has
become	their	only	concern,	we	feel	that	something	has	gone	wrong.	This	person
is	missing	some	of	the	purpose	of	life.	But	these	cases	are	rare.
I	believe	this	remains	true,	even	in	games	of	power.
Jen	works	to	set	the	agenda	in	various	aspects	of	her	life,	and	to	establish	new
norms	in	her	relationships,	associations,	and	in	broader	society.	She	is
aggressively	redefining	social	space	to	serve	her	vision	for	it.	She	hopes	that
certain	ways	of	acting	will	spread,	leading	to	social	changes	she	favors	or	that
will	put	a	certain	political	group	on	top.	She	tries	to	be	honest	with	her	partner
mainly	because	she	wants	them	to	be	honest	back	to	her.	She	uses	vocabulary
she	hopes	will	spread	and	redefine	discourse.
The	most	plausible	reading	of	Jen	is	that	she	is	up	to	something	besides	power
games.	If	we	imagine	that	norm	creation	has	become	her	only	concern—we	feel
that	something	has	gone	wrong.	She’s	missing	some	of	the	purpose	of	life.
Whether	with	Hector,	Isaac,	and	Jen—we	find	meaningful	activity	where	we
hoped	to	find	a	“silly	show”	or	“mindless	struggle”.	Yet	something	remains
unexplained.
When	introducing	Game	5,	I	mentioned	that	these	contrastive	justification	games
—with	their	upper	and	lower	levels	or	developmental	stages—get	some	of	their
appeal	because	they	speak	to	our	inner	conflicts	and	regrets.
It	is	indeed	a	struggle	to	know	what	we	want	in	life,	to	know	how	we	believe	in
living,	or	what	approach	to	take	in	each	environment.	We	sometimes	do	regret
our	social	performances	and	status	games.	But	as	I’ll	show	when	we	arrive	at
game	10,	I	think	this	is	better	explained	as	a	struggle	to	find	our	best	personal
values,	and	to	live	by	them.
Advances	in	Knowledge
Game	7.	Neil	runs	a	television	show	and	media	empire	with	the	mission	of
improving	the	accuracy	of	people's	beliefs	about	the	world.	His	fans	track	the
belief-improvements	they’ve	achieved,	with	the	idea	that	being	“less	wrong”	will
improve	their	personal	lives	and	advance	society	because	they	can	advocate	for
evidence-based	policy	and	so	on.
Neil’s	approach	is	appealing	for	many	reasons.
On	one	perspective,	a	person	cannot	even	have	the	right	goals	or	preferences	or
feelings	if	they	don’t	have	a	background	set	of	beliefs	that	made	those	goals
seem	possible,	those	preferences	advisable,	those	feelings	warranted,	etc.	Goals,
preferences,	or	feelings	based	on	wrong	beliefs	are	just	mistakes.	On	this	view,
satisfying	the	goals	or	preferences	people	have	now	would	be	foolish,	as	it
makes	sense	to	correct	their	mistakes	first.	So,	gains	in	clarity	or	knowledge	can
be	seen	as	more	important	than	anything	else	that	can	happen	to	a	person.
Another	appeal	of	Neil’s	approach	is	that	gains	in	collective	knowledge	(often
referred	to	as	Progress	or	Science)	seem	responsible	for	massive	gains	in	human
welfare.	Further	such	gains	may	present	the	best	path	to	help	more	and	more
humans	deliver	on	their	goals,	preferences,	or	feelings,	whatever	they	might	be.
Knowledge	(including	knowledge	of	how	to	better	organize	social	systems)
might	be	the	limiting	factor	in	the	full	expression	of	whatever	is	important	for
human	beings.31
And	there’s	a	third	appeal—one	directly	relevant	to	our	concerns	with
justification	games.	We	already	have	practices	for	deliberating	together,
improving	the	quality	of	our	beliefs.	We	realize	when	our	beliefs	were	improved
and	can	give	credit	to	particular	sources.	And	generally	we	can	endorse	such	a
gain	in	clarity	or	knowledge	with	our	whole	self.	Previous	justification	games
struggled	with	issues	of	autonomy	and	inner	conflict.	A	knowledge-based
justification	game	can	use	processes	like	deliberation	and	rational	argument
(rather	than	persuasion	and	brainwashing)	to	benefit	people	in	an	autonomy-
preserving	way.	Through	such	processes,	a	person	can	accept	an	epistemic	gain
on	their	own	terms,	and	credit	it	freely.
So,	can	we	make	a	robust	justification	game	based	on	self-attested	advances	in
knowledge?	I	don’t	think	so.	Not,	at	least,	the	way	knowledge	is	usually
understood.
To	gain	in	knowledge	usually	means	to	find	clearer	or	more	accurate	beliefs
about	the	world,	or	more	powerful	or	grounded	theories.	So,	the	appeals	above
suggest	a	great	human	importance	for	theories	and	details	about	how	the	world
is.	Yet,	if	this	is	what	we	mean	by	an	advance	in	knowledge,	and	if	knowledge
has	the	central	role	supposed	here,	we	should	be	willing	to	trade	many	things	for
an	advance	in	knowledge.
Kate	is	an	astronomer	and	an	orthodox	Jew.	She	spends	Saturdays	with	her
religious	community,	where	the	conversations	focuses	on	practices	and
questions	of	how	to	live,	and	rarely	turn	to	theories	about	the	world.32	People
are	always	talking	about	how	to	do	Yom	Kippur	right,	and	never	talking	about
where	God	resides	in	the	universe.	The	rest	of	the	week,	Kate	is	in	the	lab.
Neil	has	a	plan	to	upgrade	Kate’s	powers	of	perception	and	recognition.	Like
Sherlock	Holmes,	she’ll	be	better	at	noticing	things:	the	composition	of	her
environment,	patterns	in	the	stars,	clues	about	others’	emotional	states,	the
realities	of	her	political	and	economic	situation,	etc.	The	only	price	is	a
corresponding	reduction	of	her	powers	of	appreciation.	She’ll	know	more	about
what’s	going	on,	but	less	about	what	excites	her.	She’ll	have	trouble	seeing	why
to	care.	Whatever	she	currently	values	—	whether	for	its	beauty,	its	usefulness,
or	its	passion	—	she’ll	appreciate	less.	This	will	advance	Neil’s	mission—of
improving	the	accuracy	of	people's	beliefs	about	the	world—and	it	amounts	to
benefiting	Kate	in	his	terms.
Should	Kate	take	the	trade?	Would	it	make	for	a	better	life?	Would	it	make	her	a
better	scientist?	Would	the	world	be	a	better	place	if	all	of	humanity	was	more
perceptive,	more	factual,	and	less	appreciative?33
And	why,	when	given	the	chance	to	debate	Yom	Kippur	or	cosmology,	does
Kate’s	religious	community	stick	to	Yom	Kippur,	trading	away	their	chance	to
discuss	the	sort	of	factual	or	theoretical	knowledge	that	we	have	said	helps	us
have	better	goals	and	preferences	and	to	progress	as	a	civilization?	If	theories
and	facts	about	the	world	are	so	vital	to	human	life,	why	aren’t	more	people34
concerned	with	them?
Knowledge	about	Values
These	puzzles	resolve	if	we	widen	our	understanding	of	what	knowledge	is.
Here	are	two	stories	about	a	peculiar	kind	of	learning.	They	are	about	a	kind	of
knowledge	that	doesn’t	seem	to	fit	the	definitions	above.
1.	 Imagine	you	ride	your	bike	regularly,	but	you	usually	get	lost	in	your
thoughts	while	you	do	so.	One	day	you	try	to	attend	to	the	wind,	to	how	it
feels	on	your	skin,	etc.	You	like	it.	You	decide	that	this	is	how	you	want	to
do	bike	rides.	Not	for	any	payoff	--	it	just	seems	to	be	a	better	way	to	ride
your	bike.
2.	 Imagine	you	have	something	to	get	off	your	chest,	and	you	decide	to	try	to
be	honest	with	one	of	your	buddies	for	this	reason.	It	is	an	experiment,	and
you	have	this	goal	to	get	whatever	it	is	off	your	chest.	But	along	the	way,	in
being	honest	with	your	buddy,	you	discover	a	lot	of	other	advantages.	It
feels	good	to	be	honest.	The	relationship	feels	closer	to	the	kind	you	really
believe	in.	After	a	while	you	realize	that	your	honesty	is	no	longer	a	goal-
driven	tactic	or	an	experiment,	it's	just	how	you	try	to	be.	It	seems	to	be	the
best	way	to	live.
To	give	a	name	to	what	you	are	learning	in	the	two	stories	above,	I	will	say	they
are	about	learning	values.	In	the	first	story,	you	learned	the	value	of	being
sensual	while	biking.	In	the	second,	of	being	honest	with	your	friend.
From	one	angle	you	can	think	of	this	as	gaining	a	belief.	You	could	say	that	in
each	story	above,	you’ve	updated	your	set	of	beliefs	about	what	makes	up	a
good	life	for	you.	So	you	can	think	of	a	value	as	a	belief	about	what	makes	up	a
good	life.
But	what	I	mean	by	values	doesn’t	cover	just	any	belief	about	the	good	life.	I
want	to	reserve	this	word	to	mean	ideas	about	where	best	to	put	your	attention	in
certain	contexts	that	are,	furthermore,	unstrategic.35	I’ll	try	to	clarify	what	I
mean,	and	then	show	how	this	kind	of	learning	addresses	the	puzzles	of	the
previous	section.
There	is	a	sense	in	which	ideas	about	where	to	put	one’s	attention	have—among
ideas—a	special	role	in	human	life.	Even	if	you	are	pursuing	a	goal	or	making
one,	you	may	be	doing	it	because	you	have	an	idea	that	goal-making	or	goal-
pursuit	is	a	good	place	to	put	your	attention.	Some	actions—like	burping—may
not	be	mediated	by	ideas	at	all.	But	to	the	extent	that	that	ideas	steer	us,	the	ideas
about	where	to	put	attention	are	some	of	the	most	important.
These	ideas	guide	us	even	when	we	don’t	have	goals.	A	person	may	not	have
any	particular	goal	in	mind	when	they’re	chatting	with	their	best	friend,	they	just
let	the	conversation	drift.36
But	even	without	a	goal,	they	may	still	have	ideas	about	how	they	want	to	be
with	their	friend.	They	might	want	to	be	honest,	or	real,	they	might	want	to	keep
things	light,	and	so	on.	And	as	contexts	for	being	honest	or	real	or	keeping
things	light	arise,	these	ideas	come	to	guide	their	attention	for	a	moment,	as	they
improvise	the	conversational	flow.37
When	you	learn	a	new	such	idea,	about	how	to	live,	it	changes	how	you	live.	So,
these	ideas	are	more	like	preferences	or	goals	than	other	beliefs.	They	say
something	about	how	you	want	your	life	to	go,	and	about	how	you	are	steering
it.
When	I	speak	of	values,	I	mean	a	subset	of	these	ideas.	I	mean	the	ones	that	are
unstrategic.
Some	ideas	we	have	about	how	to	go	about	things	are	strategic.	We	should	look
for	opportunities	to	pass	the	other	cars,	but	only	because	we	want	to	get	there	by
8pm.	We	should	act	like	a	gentleman,	but	only	because	we	want	to	impress	our
date.
By	the	definition	here,	these	aren’t	values.	Values	include	only	such	ideas	which
have	decided	to	use	outside	of	achieving	a	particular	outcome.	In	the	second
story,	being	honest	with	your	friend	only	becomes	a	value	when	it	ceases	to	be
merely	strategic	and	gets	incorporated	in	your	general	vision.
So,	to	sum	up:	a	value	is	a	belief	about	the	good	life.	More	specifically,	it	is	an
unstrategic	idea	about	where	best	to	put	your	attention.	It	is	a	belief	that	the	good
life	unfolds	through	putting	your	attention	on	these	things.	As	such,	it’s	a	kind	of
knowledge	about	what	works	in	general—a	rough	rule	about	what	to	pay
attention	to,	when.38
Values	include	attention-guiding	ideas	about	how	to	treat	people	(honestly,
openly,	generously,	without	mercy);	how	to	act	more	generally	(boldly,
thoughtfully,	carefully);	how	to	approach	things	(with	reverence,	with	levity,	with
skepticism);	and	how	to	keep	things	(simple,	sensual,	rocking,	full	of	surprise).
❧
I’d	like	to	claim	that	this	kind	of	learning	is	what	was	missing	from	Neil’s
approach	in	Game	7.
We	can	roughly	understand	the	word	perception	to	cover	the	apprehension	of
facts,	theories,	or	patterns	in	the	world.	And	we	can	understand	appreciation	to
cover	the	apprehension	of	values.	Whereas	a	perception	forms	a	new	idea	about
the	universe,	an	appreciation	forms	a	new	idea	about	what’s	important,	exciting,
or	good.	About	what	to	attend	to.39
It	makes	sense	that	Kate	can’t	do	her	work	without	this	kind	of	“belief”	about
what’s	worth	attending	to,	or	what’s	exciting.	A	“belief”	like	this	has	to	precede
any	other	scientific	work	she	does,	otherwise	she	wouldn’t	be	interested	in	doing
it!
When	Kate	is	at	the	lab,	recording	facts	or	data	points,	this	is	foremost	an
expression	of	what	Kate	finds	important	and	interesting.	Kate	finds	the	stars	and
planets	interesting	and	wonderful,	and	so	she	observes	them.	She	finds	the	arcs
traced	by	the	planets	poetic,	and	sees	the	possibility	of	charting	their	paths	as	a
way	to	participate	in	the	great	cosmic	game.	Kate	collects	one	kind	of	data	over
another	for	a	reason,	and	those	reasons	come	from	her	values	and	appreciations.
In	general,	perceptions	happen	when	someone	thinks	something	is	important	to
look	at.40	And	statements	are	made	when	someone	thinks	they	are	important	to
say.	Without	knowing	what	to	look	at,	we	don’t	make	observations.	Without
knowing	what	we	care	about,	we’ll	never	know	how	to	frame	a	fact.	Science	can
only	detect	laws	or	patterns	amongst	phenomena	that	have	been	recognized	as
important.41	Thus,	the	progress	of	science	is	mostly	about	changes	in	what	we
find	important	to	look	at.	The	facts	unfold	before	us	once	some	values	have
made	them	important.
Kate	is	guided	in	doing	good	science—not	because	she	tries	to	get	her	facts	right
—but	because	she	is	a	valuer.	What	allows	her	to	advance	the	field	involves
being	guided	by	her	values	and	being	skilled	at	discovering	new	values.
Similarly,	if	we	extend	our	definition	of	knowledge	to	include	learning	values—
learning	about	how	to	live	well,	or	about	what’s	important	or	exciting	or	good,
or	what	to	attend	to—this	also	sheds	light	on	why	Kate’s	community	prefers	to
argue	about	how	to	do	Yom	Kippur	right,	rather	than	cosmology.	They	were
talking	about	what’s	important,	or	good,	or	what	to	attend	to	during	Yom
Kippur.
Humans	seem	very	concerned	with	this	kind	of	knowledge—we	constantly	ask
one	another	what’s	important	(whether	in	a	spouse,	a	wine,	or	a	programming
language),	or	what	to	attend	to	in	this	or	that	situation.	We	are	concerned	with
getting	values	right,	more	than	with	getting	facts	right,	because	we	want	to	direct
our	lives	well.
So,	building	a	justification	game	around	getting-facts-right	would	be	shooting
ourselves	in	the	foot.	It	would	be	inarticulate	about	our	appreciations	and	values
and	give	too	much	weight	to	learnings	which	don’t	address	our	lives.
But	let’s	see	what	a	justification	game	about	values	would	look	like!
Living	by	Their	Values
Game	8.	Charles	and	Amartya	don't	care	about	your	feelings	or	preferences
about	the	world.	But	they	are	acutely	interested	in	how	it's	important	to	you	to
live,	and	what	you	believe	is	worth	paying	attention	to	in	which	contexts.	In
other	words,	they	gather	information	about	your	values—the	guiding	principles
you	use	to	decide	what	to	attend	to	and	how	to	act	in	different	circumstances.
They	know—for	each	of	your	relationships	and	daily	contexts—the	top	values
that	guide	your	choices.	Were	you	trying	to	be	dutiful	today?	Were	you	trying	to
be	bold?	Are	you	trying	to	be	more	intimate	with	your	friends?	And	so	on.	They
want	to	make	sure	these	are	really	action	guiding—so	they	ask	whether	there
were	particular	moments	during	the	day	where	this	was	really	how	you	wanted
to	live.	They	also	ask	some	followup	questions:	do	you	have	a	good	environment
in	which	to	live	by	this	value?	How	is	it	going?	And	they	justify	projects	by
whether	they	give	you	an	environment—a	place	to	live	by	your	value	and
furthermore—when	they	help	provide	such	an	environment—if	living	by	that
value	goes	well	in	it.
This	game	avoids	some	autonomy	problems	from	the	earlier	games.	Recall	from
game	2	that	when	someone	helps	with	a	goal,	this	can	take	away	the	part	we
wanted	to	do	ourselves.	It	is	similar	when	someone	gives	us	good	feelings.	We
called	this	intrusiveness.	But	if	someone	helped	you	be	honest,	or	courageous,	or
bold—this	implies	they	left	the	important	part	to	you.	To	say	“someone	helped
me	be	courageous”	means	they	didn’t	do	it	for	you.	Helping	with	values	isn’t
intrusive,	because	values	name	the	part	we	want	to	play—the	things	we	want	to
attend	to	and	the	ways	we	want	to	act.
This	game	also	avoids	some	problems	of	inarticulacy.	It	may	seem	that	values
are	just	one	kind	of	aim	we	have—and	that	game	8	would	be	inarticulate	about
other	aims.	But,	when	a	person	says	they	have	lived	by	their	values,	this	rolls	up
many	other	assessments:
To	the	extent	that	a	person	values	choosing	ambitious	goals	or	doggedly
pursuing	them,	then	when	they	assess	that	they’ve	lived	by	those	values,
this	includes	an	assessment	that	they’ve	chosen	and	pursued	such	goals.42
To	the	extent	that	a	person	values	self-care	or	surrounding	themselves	with
comfort	and	beauty,	then	when	they	assess	that	they’ve	lived	by	those
values,	this	includes	an	assessment	that	they	were	able	to	provide	various
good	feelings	or	tasteful	things	for	themselves.
To	the	extent	that	a	person	values	disinterested	curiosity	or	getting	to	the
fact	of	the	matter,	then	when	they	assess	that	they’ve	lived	by	those	values,
this	includes	an	assessment	about	moving	towards	truth,	clarity,	or
knowledge	as	far	as	they	were	able.
And	so	on!
So,	when	you	tell	Charles	and	Amartya	that	you’ve	lived	by	your	values,	this
summarizes	many	other	assessments,	each	to	the	degree	appropriate.	It	says
you’ve	also	had	success	with	goals,	tastes,	and	other	aims.
Finally,	this	game	is	also	robust	against	three	ways	to	cook	up	justifications	that
we’ve	seen	in	other	games.
First,	with	feelings,	the	same	data	could	be	used	to	support	too	many	hypotheses
about	benefit.	I	called	this	cherry-picking	correlations.
Liz	wants	to	be	brutal,	physical,	and	centered	when	she	practices	jeet-kune-do;
she	wants	to	be	soft,	warm,	and	tolerant	with	her	family;	she	wants	to	be
calculating	and	ruthless	with	her	enemies.	Liz	thanks	Amartya	and	Charles	that
she	has	such	a	good	environment	for	practicing	her	brutality	and	centeredness.
Liz’s	values	are	scoped	to	the	contexts	in	which	she	believes	in	living	by	them.
This	establishes	a	correspondence	between	a	person’s	values	and	the	events	of
their	life.	It	is	easy	to	ask	about	people	about	the	contexts	that	go	with	a	value,	or
the	values	that	go	with	a	context.	I	could	ask	Liz	how	she	wants	to	treat	any
particular	person,	or	act	in	any	particular	situation.	Her	top	values	in	each
context	are	exactly	the	ones	she	hopes	to	keep	in	mind,	or	to	remember
intuitively,	so	that	she	manages	to	live	these	moments	in	the	way	she	believe.
It’s	not	too	hard	to	name	exactly	which	of	our	values	we	failed	to	live	out	today,
and	which	we	succeeded	at.	This	scoping	makes	cherry-picking	correlations
much	harder	than	it	would	be	with	feelings	or	goals.
Another	source	of	cooked	up	justifications	came	from	too-much	flexibility	in
reading	people,	rather	than	in	analyzing	events.	I	called	it	cherry-picking
interpretations	of	people.
Liz	also	wants	to	be	generous	in	the	manner	of	Al	Capone.	She	has	the	words	of
Shakespeare	on	her	wall:	“Those	friends	thou	hast	and	their	adoption	tried,
grapple	them	unto	thy	soul	with	hoops	of	steel.”	Marty	also	wants	to	be
generous,	but	in	the	manner	of	Oprah.	He	likes	to	think	he’s	spreading	joy	every
time	he	tweets	a	cute	photo	or	gives	away	a	ticket	to	one	of	his	DJ	gigs.
While	Liz	and	Moe	might	each	count	“generosity”	as	a	key	value,	neither	would
want	to	live	by	the	other’s	idea	of	what	the	word	means.	Do	these	two
generosities	share	a	more	abstract	parent	in	the	space	of	values?	If	they	do,
neither	Liz	nor	Marty	would	claim	that	abstraction	as	a	personal	value.	This	is
different	from	how	it	would	be	with	goals,	where	two	people	who	want	to	get	to
different	places	both	want	to	travel.
Goals	sit	amidst	hierarchies,	both	of	generality	and	of	planning.	Any	goal	can	be
further	broken	down	(either	into	steps	or	by	further	elaborating	its	specification)
or	further	generalized	(either	by	looking	for	a	more	ultimate	goal,	or	by	dropping
specificity).	This	leads	to	new	versions	of	the	goal,	which	still	count	as	goals	of
the	same	person.	This	hierarchical	arrangement	of	goals	is	why	goals-related
games	are	vulnerable	to	cherry-picking	interpretations	of	people.	The	justifier
can	pick	a	level	of	generality	or	planning	stage	at	which	the	goal	suits	their	own
interest.
Values	aren’t	like	this.	Yes,	there	are	many	kinds	of	courage,	honesty,	or
generosity—but	they	seem	to	have	definite	senses.	Only	at	a	certain	level	of
specificity	are	they	important	to	live	by—the	level	at	which	the	value	is	useful	as
a	guide	to	action	or	attention.	So,	using	a	value	seems	more	like	using	a
dictionary	word	than	a	goal.43	It’s	possible	to	ask	a	person	which	sense	they
meant,	and	their	answer	has	a	kind	of	authority	missing	from	statements	of
goals.
We	saw	a	third	way	to	cook	up	justifications	with	a	universal	recipe	for
wellbeing.	It	has	unspecified	implementation	details,	and	there	was	no	way	for
Francesca	to	verify	that	what	was	being	justified	accords	with	her	values.	Game
8,	by	contrast,	is	transparent.
All	in	all,	#8	is	the	best	game	yet.	It’s	not	intrusive	and	is	immune	to	three	ways
of	cooking	up	justifications.
Unfortunately,	that’s	not	enough.
Refining	Values
Nina	wants	to	be	both	tactful	and	clear	with	her	coworker.	Charles	and	Amartya
find	a	way	to	help	her	be	clear,	but	in	way	that’s	not	tactful	at	all.	Can	they
rightly	consider	themselves	to	have	helped	her?
Oliver	wants	to	be	firm	with	his	children.	Charles	and	Amartya	facilitate	this.
Later,	Oliver	regrets	his	earlier	value.	He	wishes	he’d	encouraged	his	children
to	be	empowered,	rebellious,	and	risk-taking,	rather	than	obedient.	He	wishes	he
hadn’t	accepted	Charles	and	Amartya’s	help.
When	Nina	has	conflicting	values	for	the	same	context,	she	finds	that	game	8
can	be	divisive—helping	one	side	of	her	against	another.	Similarly,	Oliver	finds
that	game	8	is	inarticulate	about	something	important	to	him:	he	doesn’t	just
want	to	live	by	his	existing	values;	he	also	wants	to	find	the	right	values	to	live
by.
To	address	these	problems,	it’d	be	helpful	if	we	had:
(a)	an	understanding	of	how	Nina	could	resolve	her	conflict,	or	how	Oliver
could	endorse	upgrades	to	his	values;
(b)	a	rule	about	when	the	helpful	thing	is	to	encourage	the	above,	rather
than	to	focus	purely	on	current	or	conflicted	values;
(c)	an	understanding	of	what	it	means	to	do	the	above	while	respecting
Nina’s	and	Oliver’s	autonomy,	letting	them	decide	for	themselves	which
values	to	endorse,	and	when	to	endorse	them.
There	are	three	reasons	to	think	this	is	possible	with	value-conflicts,	where	it
wouldn’t	be	possible	in	other	areas.
The	first	reason.	Recall	that	values	are	beliefs	about	what	makes	up	a	good	life.
As	such,	they	are	debatable.
Oliver	and	Pete	like	to	talk	about	their	values	very	openly,	and	they	debate	them.
Oliver	says	he	tries	to	be	honest	with	his	wife,	and	Pete	says	he	thinks	it’s	better
to	be	very	guarded	with	everyone,	to	never	share	anything	except	strategically.
Pete	says	he	is	merciless	with	his	enemies,	and	Oliver	says	he	tries	to	be
charitable	with	all	people,	to	turn	the	other	cheek.	Between	Oliver	and	Pete,	no
approach	is	considered	morally	right	or	wrong,	but	some	are	considered	wiser
than	others.	How	to	approach	things	best	is	the	topic	of	many	discussions.
We	have	the	whole	structure	of	argumentation,	deliberation,	evidence,	and	so	on,
which	we	can	use	to	offer	alternative	values	that	can	be	endorsed	by	the	other
party	as	improvements.44	Preferences	and	feelings	are	not	considered	debatable
like	this.
Oliver	and	Pete—like	many	people—are	curious	about	how	to	approach	things
best,	are	interested	in	what	others	have	to	say.	They	believe	they	can	learn
something.	In	general,	people	want	their	lives	to	work	out	well,	and	if	some	of
their	approaches	have	errors	of	thinking	in	them,	or	if	they	don’t	apply	in	exactly
the	situations	where	they	think	they	do,	people	have	an	interest	in	improving	or
refining	those	values—sometimes	by	learning	from	others.45
The	second	reason.	A	person	has	a	certain	authority	to	say	which	values	are
right	for	them.	Values	differ,	in	this,	from	other	beliefs.	We	think	of	facts	as
convergent:	measure	the	same	thing	over	and	over	again,	and	you	converge	on
the	same	data.46	Values	are	not	convergent	in	this	sense,	because	the	same
situation	may	be	approached	meaningfully	in	different	ways.	So	Oliver	and	Pete
might	both	be	on	to	something.
Values	are	also	often	developed	before	they	can	be	explained	or	justified.	The
value	of	sanding	a	boat	was	developed	before	theories	of	fluid	dynamics.	They
are	like	tools	where	it	is	easier	to	show	that	they	work	than	to	explain	why	they
work.	A	person	can	learn	a	value	through	admiration,	by	meeting	someone	who
lives	by	a	value	that	seems	like	an	improvement.	Or	through	an	intuitive
appreciation	of	the	importance	of	something.
Even	when	values	are	intuitive,	they	are	based	on	personal	experimentation	and
reflection.	Because	a	person’s	values	may	diverge	from	others’	values	and	still
be	right,	and	because	they	can	be	intuitive,	inexplicable,	and	result	from
experimentation	and	reflection	which	only	that	one	person	has	done,	a	person
must	be	considered	the	authority	as	to	their	own	values.
The	third	reason.	While	values	might	be	divergent	from	person	to	person,
within	a	person	they	converge	towards	a	manageable	and	harmonious	set.	This
happens	because	as	we	approach	a	context	(say,	a	difficult	conversation)	the
values	that	we	want	to	live	by	(like	Nina’s	tact	and	clarity)	need	to	rise	to	our
attention,	otherwise	there’s	no	way	for	us	to	live	by	them.	When	too	many
values	apply,	or	when	they	conflict,	they	cannot	guide	us	effectively.
So—unlike	preferences,	or	goals—our	values	converge	towards	a	set	that’s
realistic,	workable,	compatible,	and	integrated.47
Quinn	values	being	likable	and	fun,	but	she	also	values	being	at	ease.	At	work,
she	finds	her	efforts	to	be	likable	and	fun	are	actually	leading	to	her	feeling
tense	all	the	time.	This	makes	her	confused	about	how	to	act,	and	embarrassed.
As	we	can	see	with	Quinn,	a	conflict	in	values	is	often	accompanied	by	negative
feelings.	These	can	signal	a	conflict	between	two	or	more	values,	or	a	conflict
between	our	values	and	reality.	And	the	feelings	push	us	towards	a	resolution.
Later,	Quinn	hits	upon	the	idea	of	being	authentic	and	caring,	and	this	replaces
her	former	values	of	being	at	ease,	being	liked,	or	being	fun.	Her	new	value
seems	to	be	clearer	about	how	she	wants	to	live	than	her	previous	values,	while
also	providing	clearer	guidance	at	work.48
Quinn	might	also	say	she’d	remedied	an	error	in	thinking—that	she	used	to	think
relationships	were	about	being	liked.	In	transitioning	away	from	being	liked,	she
repaired	a	misunderstanding	of	good	relationships.	She	could	drop	the	old
values,	precisely	because	she’d	clarified	what	they’d	really	meant	for	her.	The
importance	of	the	old	values	was	captured	in	the	new,	more	comprehensive
value.
To	generalize,	when	we	are	faced	with	a	conflict	in	values,	like	Nina’s	conflict
or	Quinn’s,	we	go	in	search	of	a	way	to	reconcile	the	conflict	with	a	single	idea.
Sometimes	this	just	means	deciding	to	be	clear	in	one	context,	and	tactful	in
another.	At	other	times	we	must	ask	questions	like	“What	could	I	aim	for	that
involves	being	clear	and	tactful	at	the	same	time?”	or	“Do	I	really	believe	in
being	tactful,	or	could	it	be	that	it’s	always	more	important	to	me	to	be	clear?”
And	so	on.
We	reflect;	we	ask	other	people	about	their	values;	we	experiment;	we	see	what
works	for	us.	In	so	doing,	we	unify	our	sense	of	ourselves	and	of	the	best	way	to
live.
So,	I’ve	claimed	that	values	are	debatable,	intrapersonally	convergent,	and
interpersonally	divergent.	And	that	these	traits,	together,	mean	that	a	person	is
the	authority	about	which	values	work	for	them.
This	paints	a	very	different	picture	of	changing	or	revising	values	than	we	have
about	other	justification	games.	Changing	a	person’s	preferences	or	feelings
must	considered	a	manipulation.49	The	whole	concept	of	serving	a	person	goes
away	when	we	can	imagine	changing	their	preferences	or	feelings	arbitrarily,
because	there	is	no	way	for	the	person	to	endorse	those	changes	as
improvements,	through	experimentation	or	reflection.
But	what	if	someone	is	trying	to	change	our	values,	by	telling	us	there	are	better
approaches	than	the	one	we	are	trying	to	live	by?	Since	values	are	beliefs,	they
don’t	have	to	brain	hack	us	to	change	our	values.	They	can	just	argue	that	there’s
a	better	way	to	live.	Or	better:	they	can	offer	us	a	space	to	experiment,	trying	on
the	other	values	and	seeing	how	it	goes.
Ultimately	people	will	know	best	which	ways	of	approaching	life	work	best	for
them,	and	they	can	report	back	whether	you’ve	inspired	them	in	a	new	approach.
Living	by	Their	Present	and	Future	Values
Game	9.	Ruth	and	David	play	a	justification	game	much	like	Charles	and
Amartya’s,	but	with	an	upgrade.	Unlike	Charles	and	Amartya,	they	do	care
about	your	feelings—especially	about	feelings	of	conflict.	They	even	care	about
feelings	of	conflict	they	think	you	might	have	in	the	future.	But	they	don’t	act	to
minimize	those	feelings,	as	Larry	would.	Instead,	they	use	them	as	signals	to
offer	you	opportunities	to	debate	your	values,	or	to	experiment.	They	limit
themselves	to	doing	this	in	a	way	that	lets	you	reach	your	own	conclusions	about
how	you	want	to	live.	They	count	themselves	to	have	benefitted	you	either	when
they	help	you	find	better	values,	or	when	they	help	you	live	by	values	you	remain
unconflicted	about.
Game	8	could	be	divisive.	Game	9	is	neither	intrusive	nor	divisive.	It	respects
autonomy,	as	far	as	has	been	understood	in	this	essay.
I	also	believe	it	is	robust	to	attack	via	clever	inarticulacy.	Since	our	values	roll
up	all	of	our	other	aims,	our	values	at	any	one	time	capture	what’s	important	to
us	then.	To	this,	Game	9	also	tries	to	capture—as	best	as	can	be	done—what
might	become	important	to	us	in	the	future.	The	vocabulary	and	processes	here
capture	everything	important	to	human	beings.
Unfortunately,	there	is	a	fourth	way	to	cook	up	justifications,	which	I	mentioned
in	the	section	on	preferences:	via	a	broader	manipulation	of	the	environment.
Living	On	Their	Own	Terms
Ruth	and	David	build—as	a	side	project—a	social	network	for	entrepreneurs.
On	this	network,	certain	norms	and	expectations	arise—it	becomes	very
important	to	have	#goals,	to	be	#killingit,	and	to	be	#professional.	Many	people
adopt	these	“values”	and	this	lets	Ruth	and	David	take	credit	for	selling	them
professional	clothing,	productivity-oriented	software,	and	other	things	which
help	their	social	network	users	live	by	these	“values”.	But	their	users	wouldn’t
have	had	these	values	at	all	if	it	weren’t	for	Ruth	and	David’s	social
engineering.
This	is	a	more	expensive	way	to	cook	up	justifications	than	we’ve	covered
previously.	But	attacks	like	this	do	happen.50	Is	it	possible	to	make	a	justification
game	that’s	robust	against	them?
At	some	level,	I	believe	the	answer	is	no.	Values	only	make	sense	within	a
context.	A	person	is	more	likely	to	hit	upon	the	value	of	being	adventurous	in	a
culture	in	which	entrepreneurship,	rock	climbing,	and	so	on	are	viable	activities.
If	Ruth	and	David	have	the	capacity	to	reengineer	culture	so	these	things	are	no
longer	good	ideas	for	anyone	—if	they	can	alter	the	entire	landscape	to	make
certain	ways	of	living	impossible—their	exploit	will	be	successful.
And	yet,	I	believe	we	can	do	better	than	game	9.	We	can	harden	it	against
smaller-scale	attacks	like	the	social	network	above.	They	key	here	is	that,	at	least
at	first,	the	incentives	on	the	social	network	are	not	exactly	to	be	professional	(or
goal-driven,	or	killing	it)—but	rather	to	seem	to	be	that	way,	to	others	on	the
network.	They	are	social	performances.
I	brought	up	this	distinction	in	the	discussion	of	game	6.
The	desire	to	maintain	this	distinction	is	one	reason	I	went	out	of	my	way	to
define	values	as	unstrategic.	Social	performances	are	strategic.	By	my
definition,	then,	the	problem	with	the	entrepreneurship	network	is	that	it	injects
false	values	into	a	justification	game	that’s	not	designed	for	them.
The	way	to	harden	game	9	is	to	exclude	these	false	values,	as	best	we	can.	This
is	difficult,	because	the	users	of	their	social	network	may	not	themselves	be	clear
as	to	the	difference.
Game	10.	Joe	and	Tristan	play	a	justification	game	much	like	Ruth	and	David’s,
but	with	a	clarification.	They	try	to	collect	information	not	just	about	your
These	attributes	are	not	entirely	matters	of	performance.
They're	also	about	personal	values—the	ways	of	living	that
people	have	worked	out	for	themselves,	and	which	they
believe	in	on	their	own	terms.
We	can	see	this	by	noticing	the	difference	between	what	it	is
to	seem	ruthless	to	others,	and	what	it	would	be	to	be
ruthless	on	your	own	terms,	without	regard	to	how	you	come
off.
values,	but	also	about	how	you	act	to	influence	others,	and	to	fit	in	in	different
contexts.	In	other	words,	they	collect	information	about	norms	that	you	are
trying	to	comply	with	in	each	context,	and	norms	you	are	hoping	to	create.	These
are	used	to	help	you	separate	the	ways	you	act	to	influence	others	from	how	you
want	to	act	on	your	own	terms.
Game	6	was	about	trying	to	identify	and	write-off	social	performance	as
meaningless,	but	we	couldn’t	figure	out	how	it	could	work.
We	noted	meaningful	parts	of	status-games—for	instance,	when	a	person	is
trying	to	embody	a	certain	kind	of	leadership,	and	meaningful	parts	of	scenes—
as	in	the	formation	of	certain	church	groups	or	worker	cooperatives.	We	saw	that
certain	aspects	of	social	performances	like	masculinity	or	femininity	might	be
meaningful,	and	others	only	for	show.	For	these	reasons,	we	couldn’t	justify
excluding	status-games	or	social	performance	from	the	meaningful	part	of	life.
Game	10	defines	these	meaningful	parts—as	attempts	to	gather	around	values
that	we	endorse	on	our	own	terms.	At	the	end	of	that	section,	I	wrote:
Conclusion
It	is	indeed	a	struggle	to	know	what	we	want	in	life,	to	know
how	we	believe	in	living,	or	what	approach	to	take	in	each
environment.	We	sometimes	do	regret	our	social
performances	and	status	games.	But	as	I’ll	show	when	we
arrive	at	game	10,	I	think	this	is	better	explained	as	a
struggle	to	find	our	best	personal	values,	and	to	live	by
them.
If	someone	were	playing	game	10	with	you,	they’d	ask	certain	questions:
For	each	of	your	relationships	and	daily	contexts,	what	are	the	top	values
that	guide	your	choices?
Were	there	particular	moments	during	the	day	where	this	was	really	how
you	wanted	to	live?
Do	you	have	a	good	environment	in	which	to	live	by	this	value?
Are	you	conflicted	about	it?
How	is	living	by	this	value	going?
How	are	you	acting	to	influence	others,	and	to	fit	in	in	different	contexts?
How	do	you	want	to	live	on	your	own	terms?
My	claim	in	this	essay	is	that	we	have	reason	to	trust	someone	who	asks	these
questions—and	who	justifies	projects	by	their	answers—above	those	who	try	to
use	other	kinds	of	information.
My	claim	is	limited	in	some	ways.	I	have	discussed	four	ways	that	justification
games	can	be	exploited,	but	not	that	these	are	the	only	vulnerabilities	which
matter.	I	haven’t	shown	that	intrusiveness	and	divisiveness	are	the	only	two
autonomy-violations;	nor	that	there	are	only	four	ways	to	cook	up	justifications.
A	full	theory	of	robust	justification	games	may	need	to	go	further	and	enumerate
all	possible	attacks	using	some	kind	of	framework.	And	a	full	defense	of	game
10	may	need	to	go	into	the	role	of	values	in	choice	and	action,	or	into	how	they
can	be	specified	and	formalized,	or	whether	justifications	like	those	from	game
10	can	be	checked	by	machines.
Nonetheless,	what	I	have	written	here	might	be	enough	to	encourage	us	to	trust
people	playing	games	like	#10.	A	world	in	which	we	were	scrupulous	about	this
would	look	very	different	from	the	present.	Currently:
Google	Search	and	Amazon	help	us	with	our	goals	(Game	2)	but	do	they
help	us	live	in	the	way	we	want?
Voting	and	Markets	give	us	what	they	claim	we	prefer	(Game	3),	but—the
projects	we	vote	for,	or	the	products	we	buy	support—does	they	underwrite
the	ways	of	life	we	believe	in?
Facebook	and	Netflix	give	us	more	of	what	we	like	(Games	1	and	3),	but	do
they	give	us	more	of	what	we	value?
Something	like	game	10	could	serve	as	a	basis	for	political	decision	making,
economic	decision	making,	and	metrics	at	Internet	companies.	Indeed,	there	are
places	where	similar	games—of	which	Amartya	Sen’s	capability	approach	is	the
best	known—are	already	installed.
Cast	of	Characters
Game	1.	Positive	Feelings
Larry	assesses	your	feeling-state	periodically	and	keeps	a	log
Game	2.	Goals	Reached
Jeff,	a	billionaire,	runs	an	e-commerce	site
Andy,	a	user	with	goals,	comes	to	Jeff’s	e-commerce	platform
Belle	has	conflicting	goals
Carmen	uses	Jeff’s	digital	assistant	technology.	It	reads	her	mind.
Dante	also	uses	Jeff’s	digital	assistant	technology.	He	uses	it	to	set	up	all	of
his	relationships	and	collaborations.
Game	3.	Preferences	Revealed
Moses	is	a	city	planner	and	Mark	runs	a	social	network.	Both	play	a
justification	game	around	revealed	preferences
Emily,	a	user	with	preferences,	uses	Mark’s	app	in	a	way	that	might	reveal
a	preference	for	procrastination	and	social	isolation.
Game	4.	Advances	in	Wellbeing	or	Flourishing
Sergei	is	not	limited	to	recording	your	emotion/wellbeing/eudaemonia	state
and	inferring	what	to	do	from	it
Francesca	doesn’t	seem	to	be	going	for	wellbeing
Rosa	might	agree	with	Sergei’s	data	but	still	choose	activism	over	the
bathtub
Game	5.	Triumph	of	Our	Better	Selves	over	Our	Unreasoned	Selves
Eliezer	tries	to	recognize	when	people	are	being	rational	and	when	they
aren’t
Giorgio	has	two	selves
Game	6.	Triumph	of	Our	Better	Selves	over	Zero-Sum	Games
Scott	presumes	that	people	do	in	fact	have	good	reasons	for	even	ultimately
meaningless	acts.
Hector	has	evolved	to	play	status	games
Isaac	has	evolved	to	play	social	games	more	generally
Jen	works	to	set	the	agenda
Game	7.	Advances	in	Knowledge
Neil	runs	a	television	show	and	media	empire
Kate	is	a	scientist	and	an	orthodox	Jew
Game	8.	Living	by	Values
Charles	and	Amartya	are	acutely	interested	in	how	it's	important	to	you	to
live
Liz	wants	to	be	brutal,	physical,	and	centered	when	she	practices	jeet-kune-
do
Marty	also	wants	to	be	generous,	but	in	the	manner	of	Oprah
Game	9.	Living	by	Your	Present	and	Future	Values
Nina	wants	to	be	both	tactful	and	clear	with	her	coworker
Oliver	wants	to	be	firm	with	his	children
Oliver	and	Pete	like	to	talk	about	their	values	very	openly
Quinn	values	being	likable	and	fun,	but	she	also	values	being	at	ease
Ruth	and	David	do	care	about	your	feelings—especially	about	feelings	of
conflict
Game	10.	Living	On	Your	Own	Terms
Ruth	and	David	build—as	a	side	project—a	social	network	for
entrepreneurs
Joe	and	Tristan	try	to	collect	information	about	how	you	act	to	influence
others	and	to	fit	in	in	different	contexts
Here,	I	will	mostly	limit	my	discussion	to	justification	games	that	are	practiced
(or	practicable)	in	everyday	life.	So,	in	discussing	preferences,	I’ll	address	just
the	understandings	of	preferences	common	in	business,	public	policy,	design,
and	everyday	life.	I	won’t	argue	against	the	complex	notions	used	by	certain
preference-utilitarian	philosophers,	which	mostly	aren’t	of	practical	use	in
justifying	projects.
I	will	ensure	any	a	new	approaches	I	put	forward	are	similarly	practical.
An	argument	in	Velleman’s	Beyond	Price	suggests	that	you	mustn’t	have	a	goal
for	anyone	you	love	(even	for	them	to	be	happy),	or	you’ll	trample	on	their
agency	(which	he	says	is	the	core	of	what	you	love).
You	might	imagine	that	Larry	will	make	you	unhappy	eventually	if	he	chooses
to	be	short-term	when	you	prefer	long-term,	but	is	this	true?	He	may	be	able	to
keep	you	in	an	unreflectively	delighted	state.
If	it	were	possible	to	copy	an	individual,	try	different	interventions,	and	discern
separately	the	impacts	of	each,	and	that	these	were	additive,	this	registration
problem	could	be	overcome.	But	since	this	is	not	possible,	claims	of	benefit
justified	by	this	kind	of	data	are	unlikely	to	be	well-grounded.
Ioannadis	2005,	Why	most	published	research	findings	are	false
"a	research	finding	is	less	likely	to	be	true	when....	when	there	is	a	greater
number	and	lesser	preselection	of	tested	relationships;	where	there	is	greater
flexibility	in	designs,	definitions,	outcomes,	and	analytical	modes."
Dead	salmon	fmri	paper
You	might	think	that	it	would	help	Larry	to	have	a	large	population	to	sample
from,	but	adding	data	about	other	people	to	this	mix	can	also	make	the	problem
worse:	Larry	can	use	population	data	to	claim	that	a	certain	level	of	happiness	is
the	best	you	can	hope	for,	or	that	your	career	goals	will	make	you	unhappy.	He
can	use	other	people’s	moods	to	claim	that	a	cocaine	habit	makes	you	happier	in
the	very	long	run;	etc.
A	proper	definition	comes	later.
The	idea	of	a	tool-using,	goal-driven	person	still	shapes	and	justifies	our
operating	systems	and	design	methods	in	technology—such	as	the	Jobs	To	Be
Done	design	framework	(often	used	in	design	thinking),	and	the	meta-goal	of
augmenting	human	intellect.
Sen	1973	-	and	trace	his	references	back
Goals	can	be	reformulated	to	include	not	just	where	you	got	but	how	you	got
there.	(Sen	1973)	But	once	this	is	done	the	notion	of	goals	or	preferences	isn’t
necessary,	as	I’ll	show	with	games	8	and	9.
Optimizing	based	on	this	leads	to	the	situations	pointed	to	above—situations
where	values	like	productivity	and	efficiency	are	stars	of	the	show,	but	other
ways	of	operating	that	people	value,	like	courage	and	exploration,	are	starved.
While	goals	achieved	goes	up,	something	unaccounted	for	goes	down,	and
projects	which	were	actually	destructive	appear	beneficial.
Elizabeth	Anderson	(1993)	has	pointed	out	that	goals/preferences	views	reduce
us	to	either	valuing-by-desiring	(in	the	case	of	goals)	or	valuing-by-liking	(in	the
case	of	preferences).	These	two	ways	of	valuing	are	unusual	in	that	they	are
private	and	hard	to	argue	about.	As	we	will	see	in	game	9,	arguing	seems	to	be
an	important	component	in	robust	justification	games.
Although	the	idea	that	utility	can	be	characterized	as	a	scalar	function	has	gone
out	of	style.	See	Isaac	Levi.
See	Stigler	and	Becker	(1997)	for	an	even	more	minimalist	view,	where
everyone	has	the	same	preference	profile,	and	we	differ	instead	in	the	sort	of
internal	capital	we’ve	built	up	or	been	endowed	with,	allowing	us	to	leverage
goods	and	services	differently.
Engagement	metrics—which	I’ve	often	maligned—seem	right	based	on	this
view.	When	a	city	measures	park	use	or	a	social	network	measures	the	use	of	a
feature,	they’re	trying	to	abdicate	responsibility	for	deciding	what’s	good	for
people.
In	the	discussion	here,	I	assume	lifetime	wellbeing	is	the	kind	of	wellbeing	to	go
for.	But	this	is	an	unfounded	assumption.	Reject	it	and	this	justification	game	is
even	harder	to	make	robust.	What	kind	of	time	horizon	or	discount	rate	should
Francesca	use	in	these	decisions?	Should	she	prioritize	short-run	happiness	or
long-run	happiness?	Should	she	make	high-risk	happiness	investments?	Your
hope	for	Francesca	might	depend	on	whether	you	value	living	prudently	or
adventurously,	patiently	or	spontaneously.
Someone	who	wants	to	claim	they	are	serving	Francesca	can	claim	they	are
minimizing	pain	in	the	short	run,	or	maximizing	happiness	in	the	long	run,
whichever	supports	their	case—and	they	can	do	this	without	regard	to	how
Francesca	wants	to	live.
Max-Neef
Descriptions	of	the	upper	layer	vary	even	more	than	of	the	lower—and	they
aren’t	important	to	my	argument	here.	But	to	give	a	few:	it	may	be	supposed	that
while	most	people	are	busy	with	whatever	activities	this	lower	layer	promotes,	a
lucky	few	people	are:	“expanding	the	frontier	of	science	and	human	knowledge”,
or	“working	towards	a	non-oppression”,	or	“bringing	the	kingdom	of	God	to
Earth”,	or	“fashioning	an	authentic,	reflected	life”.
Haidt
Kahneman,	etc
“The	Elephant	in	the	Brain”
Goffman,	Girard,	Bourdieu,	and	Foucault
Indeed,	this	was	the	motivation	for	introducing	these	views—under	the	terms
metapreferences	or	multiple	selves—into	economics.	These	conflicts	and
changes	of	mind	are	part	of	life,	and	the	idea	of	revealed	preference	can’t
account	for	them.	What	our	choices	say	are	our	preferences	can’t	possibly	be	our
true	interests,	because	we	all	have	experiences	where	we	didn’t	realize	our	true
interests	until	after	we’ve	made	the	wrong	choice.
Economists	and	psychologists	like	Daniel	Kahneman,	Tyler	Cowen,	and
Jonathan	Haidt	have	advanced	multiple-selves	or	multiple-sets-of-preferences
models.	Sometimes	this	is	put	in	terms	of	an	“elephant”	(a	fast-thinking,
“irrational”,	heuristic-driven	part	of	us)	and	a	“rider”	(a	calculating,	slower	part).
These	writers	avoid	explicitly	committing	to	this	value	judgement,	but	their
work	has	been	used	to	justify	games	like	Eliezer’s,	about	getting	the	elephant
under	control.
Another	approach	is	metapreferences.	It	suffers	the	same	problem.	This	is	the
idea	that	we	have	preferences	beyond	the	ones	we	currently	hold,	preferences
about	what	we	would	like	our	preferences	to	be.	In	the	1970s,	economists
(including	Sen	)	were	briefly	enthralled	with	the	idea	of	higher-order
preferences.	(See	Hirschman	1985	for	a	tour	of	the	metapreferences	literature.)
David	Velleman,	Christine	Korsgaard,	Daniel	Hausman
Velleman,	1999
Hausman	(2011)
Velleman	Practical	Reflection	(1999)
This	story	seems	to	contract	a	popular	account,	that	people	act	from	underlying
or	unconscious	drives,	then	make	up	reasons	after	the	fact.	That	we	make	up
(when	asked)	whatever	reasons	we	can	to	justify	our	(drive-based)	actions.
Recent	versions	of	this	idea	came	from	behaviorist	psychology,	and	got	a
particular	boost	from	the	studies	by	Michael	Gazzaniga	in	the	1960s,	where
split-brain	subjects	“confabulated”	reasons	for	their	actions.	(Professor
Gazzaniga	was	my	undergrad	advisor	and	mentor	at	Dartmouth.)
But	in	Velleman’s	stories,	the	character	shows	a	remarkable	unwillingness	to
“just	make	up	reasons”	after	the	fact.	Even	when	the	arm	is	doing	something
quite	coherent,	it	appears	hard	for	the	character	to	justify	it	after	the	fact.
How	these	be	reconciled?	In	the	original	studies	(which	have	recently	failed
replication)	the	subjects	actually	had	good	reasons	for	their	actions	before	they
took	them.	They	were	told	directly	by	the	experimenter	to	take	certain	actions,
before	they	acted.	So	the	subjects	were—quite	reasonably—following
instructions.
The	reasons	for	acting	in	the	experiments	are	quite	clear:	the	scientist	in	charge
has	told	them	to	point	to	one	word	or	another	according	to	a	certain	pattern.
But	split-brain	patients,	perhaps,	were	not	able	to	explain	their	reasons	like	we
can.	The	part	of	them	that	tried	to	verbalize	why	they	did	a	thing	found	those
reasons	inaccessible,	and	tried	to	make	due	with	the	information	it	did	have.
So	the	Gazzaniga	experiments	don’t	show	that	people	act	and	make	up	reasons
afterwards.	The	split-brain	patients	acted	with	good	reasons	just	like	the	rest	of
us.
A	third	appeal	descends	from	the	story	about	tribalism	in	the	previous	section,
but	where	the	clashing	tribes	are	framed	as	“belief	systems”.	With	this	view,	it’s
not	so	much	that	people	are	understood	as	seeking	a	certain	kind	of	consistency
of	belief,	and—because	achieving	this	consistency	of	belief	is	only	possible
inside	one	systems	or	another—this	creates	a	clash	of	civilizations,	or
worldviews,	or	belief	systems.	Sometimes	those	with	this	view	believe	that
there’s	one	“correct”	belief	systems:	often	the	scientific/Liberal	one,	although
occasionally	it’s	a	traditional,	“nonwestern”	one.	Others	just	imagine	a	kind	of
continual	struggle	with	no	right	answer.
In	the	standard	versions	of	this	view,	religions	or	“civilizations”	are	considered
as	monolithic	and	as	defined	not	by	their	norms	and	practices,	but	rather	by	their
beliefs.	So	Islam	is	defined	by	“belief	in	the	Koran,”	and	the	West	by	“belief	in
Science,”	or	maybe	“belief	in	Christianity,”	or	something	roughly	like	that.
But	when	you	modify	the	terms	in	this	way,	the	“clash	of	civilizations”	isn’t	a
matter	of	worldviews—Muslim	vs	Scientist—but	rather	a	clash	of	different
approaches	to	living	well.
And	if	you	go	to	church,	you're	more	likely	to	find	Christians	talking	about	hope,
faith,	or	charity	than	exactly	how	old	the	dinosaur	bones	really	are.
It’s	not	clear	that	we	even	have	pure	perceptions.	Try	looking	around	you	in	a
way	that’s	purely	about	perception	without	any	appreciation	or	sense	of	value.	In
my	experience,	this	is	neither	possible	nor	desirable.
devout	Bayesians,	and	Sherlock	Holmes,	aside
This	values-driven	account	of	human	nature	has	antecedents	in	Aristotle,
Aquinas,	and	Kant.	A	subculture	of	academics	and	writers	with	this	view	formed
initially	as	a	reaction	to	mid	20th-century	post-modern	views	which	didn’t
distinguish	between	values	and	norms,	and	which	conceptualized	all	culture	as	a
kind	of	war.	There	were	simultaneous	reactions	to	this	in	literature	—	via	the
New	Sincerity	of	David	Foster	Wallace	and	Miranda	July	—	and	amongst
academics	who	viewed	meaning	as	concrete,	communicable,	accessible,	lived,
and	not-entirely-subjective	phenomenon:	most	notably	Charles	Taylor,	but	also
Velleman,	Chang,	Korsgaard,	Putnam,	and	many	others.
The	understanding	of	values	I	present	here	comes	from	this	philosophical
tradition.	If	you	want	to	go	straight	to	the	source,	read	David	Velleman’s
Practical	Reflection	and	How	We	Get	Along,	and/or	Charles	Taylor’s	Sources	of
the	Self.	If	you	want	group	exercises	to	get	clear	about	your	own	values,	check
out	the	classes	and	worksheets	at	Human	Systems
Someone	might	go	into	a	salary	negotiation	with	a	goal	—	a	concrete	outcome
they	hope	to	achieve	—	but	even	with	a	goal,	they	still	have	ways	they	want	to
approach	it.	Someone	may	want	to	be	courageous	in	their	salary	negotiation,	or
fair-minded.
Some	values	only	apply	in	extremely	particular	situations,	for	instance,	a	electric
blues	guitarist	may	have	the	value	of	“crispy	licks”,	a	mother	of	“letting	her
child	get	bumped	around	a	bit”,	an	improviser	of	“maintaining	a	loose	awareness
of	the	shape	of	the	room”,	etc.
Just	like	someone	could	get	distracted	and	forget	one	of	their	goals—perhaps
arriving	late	to	a	meeting—someone	can	forget	one	of	their	values,	and	for
example	end	up	wishing	they’d	remembered	to	notice	their	sensations	on	that
bike	ride.
Like	plans,	values	are	necessary	because	of	our	bounded	rationality.	We	are
unable	to	calculate,	in	each	conversation,	at	each	moment,	what	to	reveal	and
what	to	conceal.	Instead,	a	person	adopts	the	general	value	of	being	honest,
because	they’ve	decided	this	is	a	good	thing	to	aim	at,	in	general.	So	we
formulate	values	as	guidelines	for	ourselves,	because	to	live	without	them	would
mean	continuous,	difficult	calculations.	(Bratman)
Although	not	directly	about	value	realism,	Boyd’s	“How	to	Be	a	Moral	Realist”
is	great	on	this;	Gibson’s	(“The	Senses	Considered”)	account	of	perception	is
also	relevant.
Or	when	our	genes	think	something	is	important	to	look	at.
Even	if	you	find	something	new	amidst	data	that	was	recorded	for	a	different
reason,	your	act	of	noticing	this	new	thing	is	still	driven	by	an	interest	in	it—a
value	this	pattern	has	for	you.
Values	are	more	fundamental	than	goals,	because	values	guide	us	in	picking	and
revising	our	goals.
While	some	values	(like	the	above)	have	names,	most	don’t.	But	values	without
names	can	usually	be	referred	to	by	phrases	such	as	“honoring	the	dead”,	or
“building	the	capacity	of	the	team	to	handle	problems	together”.	As	with	goals
and	beliefs,	no	such	phrase	ever	expresses	the	entirety	of	what	someone	means
by	a	value.
Any	sentence	can	be	read	different	ways—including	any	sentence	about	values
or	goals.	When	you	go	to	the	store	to	buy	bread,	are	pretzels	also	a	possibility?
Statements	of	a	person’s	values	in	language	do	have	this	ordinary	ambiguity	(as
do	statements	of	goals	or	preferences	or	any	other	statement).	In	general	this
ordinary	ambiguity	is	tractable—you	can	always	ask	someone	to	be	more
specific,	to	explain	whether	they	meant	this	word	meaning	or	that	other	one,	to
expand	a	phrase	into	a	paragraph.
Short	value	statements	like	“being	courageous”	or	“being	honest”	will	always
need	to	be	expanded	in	this	way	to	get	at	how	the	person	actually	wants	to	live,
just	as	a	short	goal	statement	like	“start	a	company”	doesn’t	fully	specify	the
goal—would	they	be	happy	starting	a	barbershop?	Clarification	is	needed	and
clarification	is	possible.	There	is	no	point	of	absolute	clarity,	but	in	practice	we
can	figure	out,	for	different	audiences,	how	specific	to	be,	and	such	language
works	out	most	of	the	time.
Charles	Taylor	-	epistemic	gain
Ruth	Chang	-	a	more	comprehensive	value
David	Velleman	-	advances	in	self	understanding
We	can	even	say	that	Oliver	and	Pete	have	discovered	the	same	(objective)
value,	if	we	grant	that	it’s	possible	for	them	to	do	roughly	the	same	values-
experiment	(say,	trying	honesty	and	dishonesty	with	their	spouse).
Actually,	I	think	the	case	for	the	convergence	of	facts	is	overstated.	Because
different	values	in	the	recording	of	data	lead	to	different	facts	being	recorded,
facts	are	divergent	in	the	same	shape	as	values,	and	facts	can	go	off	in	different
workable	directions,	just	like	values	can.
This	process-based	view	has	swept	through	economics	and	analytic	philosophy
since	the	late	1980s,	replacing	ideas	about	metapreferences	and	multiple	selves.
I	refer	to	a	particular	process-based	view,	combining	three	ideas:	first,	that	we
don’t	tend	to	act	when	we	have	only	desires	but	no	reasons;	second,	that	to	have
a	good	reason	is	to	have	undergone	a	process	of	reflection	which	has	succeeded;
third,	that	such	success	is	an	endorsement	based	on	our	“identity”:	our	sense	of
who	we	believe	we	are	and	who	we	believe	in	being.	By	2002,	Sen	had	switched
to	this	view,	but	it	is	already	present	in	Velleman	1985,	Korsgaard	1992,	and
Quinn	1993.
On	this	view,	when	we	choose,	we	do	so	based	on	a	rough	guess	of	what	our	true
interests	are,	and	we	are	always	looking	to	improve	that	guess	by	finding	better
values.	This	is	a	process	of	refining	our	sense	of	ourselves	and	of	the	best	way	to
live,	based	on	new	considerations,	reflections,	and	experiments.
It	says	that	change	comes	through	participation	in	a	process	—	of	reflection	and
discovery	and	clarification	—	leading	to	a	better	understanding.
The	process	continues:
Later,	Quinn’s	new	value	of	being	authentic	and	caring	comes	into	conflict	with
being	effective.	She	notices	herself	being	uncaring	while	pushing	groups	to	be
effective.	Feeling	frustrated	and	confused,	she	resolves	this	with	a	new	view	of
effectiveness,	one	that’s	about	fostering	capacity	in	herself	and	others.
Again,	a	misunderstanding	is	corrected:	she	used	to	think	that	teams	were	about
getting	things	done.	In	transitioning	away	from	being	effective,	she	corrected	a
similar	misunderstanding	about	good	teams.
This	diagram	shows	how	Quinn’s	conflicts	lead	her	(via	feelings)	to	find	more
comprehensive	values:
“Brain-hacks.”
Edward	Bernays	-	Early	ads	for	smoking	-	plus	actual	social	networks.
